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A REVISIONIST THEORY OF ABSTENTIONt 
Barry Friedman* 
There is a widespread perception that the forum of litigation may 
be as outcome-determinative as the underlying merits. 1 This percep-
tion accounts for the importance of the abstention doctrines.2 In ab-
t © 1989 by Barry Friedman. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. A.B. 1978, University of Chicago; 
J.D. 1982, Georgetown University. - Ed. I would like to thank Bob Belton, Jim Blumstein, Jon 
Charney, Michael Collins, Tom McCoy, Marty Redish, Gerry Spann, Michael Wells, Larry 
Yackle, and Nick Zeppos for their thoughtful review of an earlier draft of this article. I am 
indebted to Bums Newsome, Jon Pittman, and Amy Stutz for untiring research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
94 YALE L.J. 71, 112 (1984) (hereinafter Redish, Separation of Powers] ("The Supreme Court has 
recognized the important interrelations between congressional jurisdictional allocations and sub-
stantive congressional programs •... "); Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 325 
(1988) (hereinafter Wells, Disparity] (discussing rules allocating cases between federal and state 
courts, and asserting, "[t]he Realists taught, and virtually everyone now acknowledges, that the 
rules of procedure ... have a major impact on how the substantive principles of law operate in 
practice") (citation <;>mitted); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforce· 
ment of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 666 (1987) [hereinafter Zeigler, 
Rights Require Remedies] ("the Court has not diluted the content or substance of rights directly; 
instead it has created procedural barriers," e.g., requiring vindication of federal rights in state 
court); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE 
L.J. 498, 521 (1974) ("[s)tatutes that foreclose only lower federal court jurisdiction have more 
subtle but no less serious substantive effects") (footnote omitted); P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. 
MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 480 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WESCHLER] (courts will consider possible state 
hostility to federal goal in determining whether jurisdiction should be exclusively in federal 
court). 
2. Commentary on the abstention doctrines is extensive. See, e.g., Althouse, The Misguided 
Search/or State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051 (1988); Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 
22 WM. & MARYL. REv. 605 (1981); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation 
of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1974); Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifyi11g 
Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Proceedings, 66 N.C. L. REV. 49 (1987); Currie, 
Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1978); Davies, Pullman and 
Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1986); Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV, 
1141 (1988); Field, Abstention in Co11stitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doc· 
trine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974) (hereinafter Field, Pullman Abstention]; Field, The Absten· 
tion Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977) [hereinafter Field, Abstention Today]; Field, 
The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARYL. REV. 683 (1981) [hereinafter 
Field, Federal Jurisdiction]; Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal 
Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the 
Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99 (1986); Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1977); Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1; Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. 
Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978) [hereinafter Redish, 
Younger Doctrine]; Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985); Wells, 
Disparity, supra note 1; Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 
1097 (1985) [hereinafter Wells, Abstention]; Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal 
Courts, 60 N.C. L. REv. 59 (1981) [hereinafter Wells, Comity]; Yackle, Explaining Habeas 
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stention cases, a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction it 
unquestionably possesses in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
state court. Thus, the plaintiff who has chosen to litigate in a federai 
forum is forced into state court. 
There also is a widespread perception that state courts are less re-
ceptive than federal courts to federal claims of right. 3 This perception 
accounts for the controversial nature of the abstention doctrines. 
Commentators almost uniformly condemn the Supreme Court's ab-
stention doctrines on the ground that federal cases consistently are 
relegated to state courts despite the virtually "unflagging obligation"4 
of federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction bestowed upon them by 
Congress, and plaintiffs' repeated choice of federal fora in which to 
vindicate federal rights. 5 
Abstention might be less controversial if the Supreme Court of-
fered a clear and plausible justification for requiring lower federal 
courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction, but so far such a justification 
has eluded the Court. The abstention doctrines generally are ex-
plained in terms of "comity" and "federalism,"6 but why these consid-
erations often require a refusal to exercise congressionally granted 
jurisdiction, or how they indicate the outcome in a given case, is al-
most anyone's guess. Even the few commentators who have supported 
some form of judicial abstention have failed to develop a rationale that 
provides guidance to litigants or courts as to when abstention is 
appropriate. 7 
The importance, controversial nature, and disarray of the absten-
tion doctrines were evident in the recent litigation between Pennzoil 
and Texaco.8 Pennzoil sued Texaco in Texas state court over the 
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985); Ziegler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light 
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987; Ziegler, Rights Require Reme-
dies, supra note 1. 
3. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
7. For example, Professors Shapiro and Wells have argued in support of the principle of 
abstention, but their theories are so indefinite as to provide little or no guidance for deciding 
individual cases. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 583-85 (defending discretion to abstain and setting 
out only extremely broad factors to guide that discretion); Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 74-75 
(defending comity rationale as an acceptable tool with which the Court may justify "arbitrary" 
decisions in federalism cases); Wells, Abstention, supra note 2, at 1128-32. 
8. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). For an excellent discussion of the Pennzoil 
decision, see Althouse, supra note 2. Professor Althouse argues that Pennzoil was an appropriate 
case for abstention because the federal interest in protecting rights was not great, and urges a 
return in abstention cases to examining the federal interest in interfering with state proceedings, 
rather than the state interest in being free from such interference. 
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purchase of Getty Oil, alleging tortious interference with contract. 
The jury returned a verdict against Texaco for more than $10 billion.9 
Rather than pursuing post-judgment remedies in state court, Texaco 
filed suit in federal court in New York, seeking to enjoin Pennzoil 
from enforcing the judgment. Texaco claimed that the Texas proceed-
ings violated Texaco's rights under the U.S. Constitution and federal 
statutes. At bottom, Texaco claimed that Texas state court processes 
were inadequate to protect federal rights. Io 
The jurisdictional statutes under which Texaco filed suit in federal 
court were enacted by Congress to provide a federal forum for litigants 
challenging state action as unconstitutional, on the premise that state 
courts were inadequate to protect federal rights. I I Pennzoil sought 
dismissal of the federal action, however, under the abstention doc-
trines. I2 One of the underlying premises of abstention is that state 
courts are adequate to protect federal rights. I3 Of course, these two 
broad premises cannot logically exist side-by-side, and yet they con-
tinue to co-exist in abstention cases, with no serious attempt by the 
courts to reconcile them. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. makes 
clear that abstention is an ailing doctrine. Although the Court or-
dered the district court to abstain in favor of state court jurisdiction, I4 
it took six Justices writing separately, offering varying conceptions of 
three rather different abstention doctrines, to explain the Court's deci-
sion. Is To say that the Court was fragmented, or that abstention law 
is unclear, would be a vast understatement. 
In cases such as Pennzoil, involving large corporations, allowing 
federal rights to be determined by arguably less-than-sympathetic state 
9. 481 U.S. at 4. 
10. 481 U.S. at 6. 
11. Suit was filed under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1983 (1982). As to Congress' 
intent in enacting those statutes, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
12. See 481 U.S. at 6-7. 
13. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
14. 481 U.S. at 17. 
15. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded that Younger abstention was appropriate 
in the case. He indicated that Pullman abstention might also be appropriate, but declined to 
apply the Pullman doctrine, noting simply that "considerations similar to those that mandate 
Pullman abstention are relevant to a court's decision whether to abstain under Younger." 481 
U.S. at 11 n.9. Justice Brennan concluded that Younger abstention was inappropriate because, in 
his view, Younger is inapplicable to civil proceedings. 481 U.S. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
Justice Marshall decided that there was no need to reach the Younger issue because he believed 
that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction. 481 U.S. at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
Justice Blackmun argued that application of the Younger abstention doctrine was inappropriate, 
but would have abstained under the Pullman doctrine. 481 U.S. at 27-29 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). Finally, Justice Stevens believed that Younger abstention was inappropriate in the case. 
481 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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courts may not seem to undermine the protection against government 
infringement of individual rights that federal jurisdiction was designed 
to provide. The same can hardly be said, however, for cases such as 
Moore v. Sims, where a state court deprived parents of the custody of 
their child, utilizing procedures that arguably failed to comport with 
fede~al constitutional guarantees. 16 If state courts are indeed unsym-
pathetic to claims of federal rights, then denying a federal forum 
strikes squarely at interests federal jurisdiction was intended to pro-
tect. In cases such as Moore v. Sims, the abstention principle cries out 
for justification. 
Acknowledging that in some form the principle of abstention prob-
ably is here to stay, this article offers a revisionist theory of abstention. 
The key to this revisionist theory is recognizing that the Supreme 
Court's decisions expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction and its 
decisions requiring abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
employ very different premises regarding the adequacy of state courts 
to protect federal rights, and that these premises must be reconciled if 
abstention ever is. to make any sense. The competing premises can be 
reconciled because in some cases falling within federal jurisdiction an 
initial federal trial forum is unnecessary to vindicate federal rights; in 
such cases, state court proceedings followed by Supreme Court review 
will protect federal rights. Where federal rights are protected in this 
way, state interests in state-court adjudication justify abstention. The 
revisionist theory rests on the notion that federal review may be neces-
sary to protect federal interests, but accommoddtes the abstention doc-
trine on the ground that such review need not always occur in a 
federal trial forum. 
This article offers a straightforward model for identifying cases in 
which abstention threatens federal rights - and so is inappropriate -
and cases in which federal rights are not so threatened and state inter-
ests require abstention. Part I provides some background on the ab-
stention doctrines, clarifying· the competing premises that must be 
reconciled in order to develop a coherent, unified abstention doctrine. 
Part II then sets out the basis for the revisionist theory and the man-
ner in which it would operate, arguing that a federal trial forum only 
need be - and only should be - available where necessary to protect 
federal rights. For example, if fact-finding is not critical to a federal 
plaintiff's case, initial litigation in state court· followed by U.S. 
Supreme Court review should satisfy federal concerns. Part III ex-
16. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). The federal district court found the state procedures unconstitu-
tional in important respects, but the Supreme Court vacated, holding the district court should · 
have abstained. 
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plains at some length how application of the revisionist theory would 
be consistent with most of the Supreme Court's abstention precedents, 
while providing a more satisfactory explanation for those precedents 
which would give meaningful guidance to lower courts and litigants as 
to when abstention is appropriate. Finally, the concluding section an-
swers some of the potential questions raised by the revisionist theory, 
including whether the revisionist theory requires too much ad hoc 
decisionmaking in abstention cases, and whether direct U.S. Supreme 
Court review is adequate in any given case to protect federal rights. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
As a general rule, a court possessing jurisdiction must exercise it to 
resolve a properly presented dispute.17 Courts differ from legislative 
and executive bodies of government in this respect: while the latter 
two set their own agendas, courts generally are held open to all com-
ers.18 In federal courts, this principle takes on particular strength, for 
it often is said that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obliga-
tion" to exercise the jurisdiction they possess. 19 
One exception to the general rule that arouses considerable contro-
versy is found in Supreme Court decisions that require a lower federal 
court possessing jurisdiction to decline to exercise that jurisdiction in 
favor of the jurisdiction of a state court. Although the circumstances 
in which a federal court is called upon to stay its hand vary widely, the 
practice of declining jurisdiction in favor of state courts is called 
abstention. 20 
17. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971) ("[l]t is a timc-
honored maxim of the Anglo-American common-law tradition that a court possessed of jurisdic-
tion generally must exercise it.") (citation omitted); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 
404 (1821) ("We [courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, 
then to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitu-
tion."); HART & WESCHLER, supra note l, at 747. 
As Professor Shapiro argued, however, the general rule is not without its exceptions. See 
Shapiro, supra note 2. Indeed, the exceptions are sufficiently numerous, and their application 
sufficiently frequent, that the "general" nature of the rule might properly be questioned. For 
example, equity courts stay their hand under a variety of discretionary standards, and courts 
with jurisdiction send litigants to other courts with jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. See generally id. at 555-57. But none of these exceptions has aroused controversy to 
the extent that the abstention doctrine has. 
18. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 785 n.14 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) ("[L]egislative bodies possess at least one attribute, ..• the power to set an 
agenda, that trial courts lack."); 456 U.S. at 784 ("[T]rial courts of general jurisdiction do not 
choose the cases that they hear ..•• "). 
19. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (quoting Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); see also 
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). 
20. It is commonplace to divide the cases that rely upon the principle of abstention into a 
number of smaller doctrinal groups. The Pullman abstention doctrine, for example, found its 
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Abstention is controversial because it hampers a plaintiff's access 
to a lower federal court, even though the federal court has jurisdiction 
over the case and the parties. On some occasions, abstention means 
only a delay in federal resolution: an issue is presented initially to a 
state court, but litigants may return to federal court for final resolution 
of federal questions.21 More commonly, however, abstention is tanta-
mount to abdication of jurisdiction by the lower federal courts. Under 
governing Supreme Court precedent, res judicata generally bars fed-
eral reconsideration of questions resolved in state proceedings.22 
Thus, in many abstention cases, the lower federal court loses its 
chance to decide the federal issue altogether.23 
genesis in Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), in which the Court held that a 
lower federal court should, as a rule, stay its hand to permit state courts to resolve unsettled state 
law questions that might obviate the need to reach the federal question presented in a case. 
Similarly, the Younger abstention doctrine is traced back to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), in which the Court held that absent specified circumstances a federal court should not 
enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding. 
It is useful to acknowledge at the outset that the division of the abstention cases into discrete 
doctrines may be more imaginary than real. The abstention doctrines defy strict categorization, 
so it is not surprising that courts and commentators define the categories in different terms, and 
that the categories change over time. Compare Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 n.29 
(1943) with Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 
(1976) (offering different descriptions of the abstention doctrines). See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 
431 U.S. 434, 460 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (abstention is a doctrine that "has bewildered 
other federal courts for years"); c. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 303 (4th ed. 
1983); Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1147-48 (noting that the various categories of 
the doctrine are less than clear); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies, supra note 1, at 683 ("[l]ittle 
consensus has been achieved on how [the doctrines] should be grouped or even on how many 
different doctrines exist"). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged the difficulty with 
placing the abstention cases in categories, noting: "The various types of abstention are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of 
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel 
judicial processes." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
21. This is the case with so-called Pullman abstention. See Railroad Commn. v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, a group of black railway employees sued in federal district 
court, claiming that an order by the Texas Railway Commission requiring a certain number of 
white conductors on each train violated their rights under the fourteenth amendment. 312 U.S. 
at 497-98. The Supreme Court ordered federal abstention so that the Texas state courts could 
determine whether, under Texas law, the Commission had the authority to issue the order. 312 
U.S. at 501. A decision by the Texas courts that the Commission had no such authority would 
have mooted the constitutional issue. 312 U.S. at 501. If the state court upheld the Commis-
sion's authority under Texas law, the case could always then return to federal court for resolu-
tion of the federal issue. See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Pullman abstention. But see Field, Abstention Today, supra note 2, at 591 (delay and expense 
caused by Pullman abstention may deter claimants even from seeking a federal forum in the first 
place). 
22. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical 
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (1982) (''The ... judicial proceedings of any ... state ... shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States ... as they shall have by law or usage in the 
courts of such State ... from which they are taken."). Habeas corpus is the noteworthy excep-
tion to this principle. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Allen, 449 U.S. 90 (federal civil rights action based on unlawful search and 
seizure by state officers barred by prior state adjudication of claim in suppression hearing); 
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The Supreme Court justifies application of the abstention doctrines 
- and the concomitant denial of a federal forum - by relying primar-
ily upon a concern for comity and federalism interests.24 Comity re-
fers to the relations between coordinate state and federal judicial 
systems.25 The concern is that when federal courts decide issues that 
could be. resolved by state courts, the federal courts implicitly may call 
into question the ability or willingness of state courts to apply federal 
law faithfully.26 Federalism, in turn, refers to the relations between 
state and federal sovereigns. 27 The concern here is the federal courts' 
potential to usurp the role of state courts in addressing matters of state 
policy.28 Finally, there is a concern for sound judicial administration: 
state courts, and the litigants before them, should not be subject to the 
"disruptive" effect of parallel or preemptive federal proceedings.29 
Critics attack the abstention decisions on a number of grounds. 
Professor Martin Redish argues that the Court violates separation-of-
Yackle, supra note 2, at 1043 (in civil context, where habeas corpus is unavailable, Supreme 
Court provides the only federal review of a federal claim). 
24. Younger abstention originally was justified not only by comity concerns, but also by 
traditional principles of equity jurisdiction. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). 
Equity courts would not issue injunctions if there was an adequate remedy at law: because state 
criminal proceedings presented an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims, the federal court 
would stay its hand. 401 U.S. at 43-44. In the latest cases applying Younger, however, the equity 
rationale has disappeared completely, leaving comity and federalism as the controlling factors. 
See infra note ll8. 
25. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 ("[Comity is] a proper respect for state functions, a recogni· 
tion of the fact that theentire country is made up ofa Union of separate state governments, and a 
•.. belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left 
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."). For the origins of the comity 
principle, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 61-64; Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 61 n.5. · 
26. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 {1977) {observing "the negative reflection 
on the State's ability to adjudicate federal claims ..• whenever a federal court enjoins [a] pend· 
ing state proceeding"); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) {federal intervention in 
state criminal proceedings might "[reflect] negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce 
constitutional principles"); see also Bator, supra note 2, at 625 (arguing that the exercise of fed· 
eral jurisdiction in some cases may be sending the message to the state courts that "they can't 
and won't speak for the Constitution"). 
27. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (federalism is a "system in which there is sensitivity to the 
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments ... in which the National Govern· 
ment ..• always endeavors to [protect federal rights and interests) in ways that will not unduly 
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States"). 
28. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979) (federal intervention may "prevent the 
informed evolution of state policy by state tribunals"); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 
609 (1975) {federal.intervention prevents states from hearing constitutional objections to state 
policies); Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315 (1943) {federal intervention hinders state implementa· 
tion of important regulatory policies). Professor Martin Redish has done a careful study of the 
arguments concerning federal court usurpation of state policy, and has concluded that many of 
Younger's comity and federalism rationales actually conflict with one another. See Redish, 
Younger Doctrine, supra note 2. 
29. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1976); 
see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; Bulfbrd, 319 U.S. at 326-28; Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
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powers principles when it instructs lower federal courts not to exercise 
the jurisdiction granted them by Congress. 30 Because Congress, and 
not the Court, controls the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, 
judicial abstention flouts the will of Congress.31 Other critics argue 
that abstention is contrary to the general rule that a plaintiff's choice 
of forum is entitled to respect. Often more than one court has subject-
matter and personal jurisdiction over a dispute and its parties; the 
choice among fora traditionally belongs to the plaintiff. 32 The critics 
point out that the entire concept of abstention is, at bottom, simply 
antithetical to the obligation of federal courts to exercise the jurisdic-
tion granted them. 33 
Missing from this summary of the debate, of course, is any expla-
nation of why abstention's critics believe it matters if a plaintiff is de-
nied a federal forum. 34 Implicit in every criticism of abstention is the 
assumption that, absent a federal forum, federal rights will not be vin-
dicated. 35 Abstention's critics are of the view that state courts are not 
as sensitive to claims, of federal rights as are federal courts. 36 Thus, 
denial of a federal forum runs the risk of effectively denying the plain-
30. Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 76-79: Professor Redish argues that Con-
gress, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, has established "a network of federally-
protected substantive rights and simultaneously vested the federal· courts with jurisdiction to 
enforce those laws, and the Supreme Court lacks the authority to ignore or invalidate those 
statutes .... " Id. at 77 (footnote omitted); see also Kurland, supra note 2, at 489 ("Congress has 
created the right to utilize the federal courts in specified circumstances and .•• the Court has no . 
right to limit that right of access, since the jurisdiction of the federal 'COurts are, by Constitutional 
command, to be fixed by the legislature."). 
31. Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 78 (abstention "effectively .•. repeal[s] 
[jurisdictional] legislation" and "renders pointless the entire legislative process"). 
32. Field, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 722 & n.168; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 575 & 
n.194; Yackle, supra note 2, at 1024 & n.150; see also Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255· 
(1981) (there is "a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum"); Zwickler v. 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) ("Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal 
judiciary to respect a suitor's choice of a federal forum ...• "). 
33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
34. The failure to set out the underlying reasons for disagreeing with the decision to abstain 
is endemic in the Younger decisions. See Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 298 ("The dissenting 
opinions [in Younger cases] leave quite unclear why any of these reasons should matter to liti-
gants or judges, for, as far as the opinions are concerned, the only issue appears to be the address 
of the courthouse."). · 
35. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 2, at 2-3 ("Those who believe that federal courts are particu-
larly qualified to protect constitutional claims view abstention as threatening that protection."); 
Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 284-85 & n.4. 
36. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1105 (challenging what he calls the "myth ... that 
state courts will vindicate federally secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower 
federal courts"); Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note l, at 91-92 ("Ifit is thought that state 
judges ... will be more sympathetic to state concerns, then it is difficult to see how state judges . 
can also be equally enthusiastic enforcers of federal rights against state action."); Redish, 
Younger Doctrine, supra note 2, at 483 ("Harsh reality may justify doubts about the competence 
of state courts in enforcing federal rights."). 
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tiff a federal right. 37 
In light of the dispute over the relative sensitivity of state and fed-
eral courts to claims of federal rights, Supreme Court abstention deci-
sions must go beyond explaining why deference to state proceedings is 
important and explain why denial of a federal forum will not affect the 
vitality of federal rights. The Court's explanation is straightforward: 
state courts are as sensitive as federal courts to claims of federal 
rights. 38 In fact, an important part of the justification for abstention is 
to avoid creating the impression that state courts are less competent to 
address, and less attentive to, federal rights than are federal courts. 39 
The difficulty with the Court's justification for abstention is that on 
this core issue of state court sensitivity to federal rights the Court's 
own opinions support abstention's critics. The Court's abstention 
opinions suffer from a kind of selective amnesia, forgetting how the 
cases from which it now orders the lower courts to abstain originally 
came to fall within federal jurisdiction. More often than not, the fed-
eral plaintiff asserting federal jurisdiction is relying upon Supreme 
Court decisions that broadened the reach of federal jurisdiction pre-
cisely because state courts could not be trusted to protect federal 
rights.40 
Thus, there is a fundamental inconsistency in the C?urt's jurispru-
dence concerning the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In cases constru-
37. The Supreme Court has made precisely this assumption. In commenting on the legisla-
tive history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which provides a civil cause of action against state officers who 
violate constitutional rights), the Court noted: "It is abundantly clear that one reason the legisla· 
tion was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because [the citizen's rights] guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). See also Neubome, supra note 2, at 1115 ("choice between federal and 
state courts as constitutional enforcement forums continues to exert an effect on the nature of the 
resulting federal right"); Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 111 (the "legislative intent 
[of§ 1983] was to interpose the federal judiciary between the individual and the state, largely 
because of the failure of the state courts adequately to protect the individual"). 
38. See, e.g., Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (rejecting "a general distrust of the 
capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues"); Moore v. Sims, 
442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979) (rejecting notion that "state courts were not competent to adjudicate 
federal constitutional claims"); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975) (because 
state judges are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, the Court ought not to assume that 
they will not do so); see also Neubome, supra note 2, at 1117 (the Court now assumes that state 
courts are as competent as federal courts); Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 297 (the Court 
dismisses arguments that the state courts are insensitive to federal rights "with a sentence or two 
expressing confidence in the state courts"). 
39. See supra note 38. 
40. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (expanding the cause of action avail-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allow civil suits against state officers whose action violated state 
law); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (expanding the definition of authorized excep-
tions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, to allow a plaintiff to seek federal injunctive 
relief under§ 1983 because "the very purpose of§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts be-
tween the States and the people .... [T]his Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive 
relief ... can ... be essential to prevent ... loss of a person's constitutional rights."). 
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ing congressional statutes to confer jurisdiction, the Court expressed a 
concern about state court protection of federal rights. But in cases 
ordering abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the Court 
denied any such concern, vigorously asserting state sensitivity to 
claims of federal rights.41 
This inconsistency is most apparent in federal civil rights cases, 
particularly those brought under sections 1983 and 1343.42 In Monroe 
v. Pape, 43 decided almost eighty years after enactment of those civil 
rights statutes, the Supreme Court for the first time opened wide the 
doors to federal civil rights actions by holding that the "under color of 
state law" language in those statutes applied to the actions of state 
employees even when those actions were unauthorized by state law.44 
What is significant about the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, and 
related cases, is that this dramatic expansion in the availability of fed-
eral jurisdiction in civil rights cases rested upon a fundamental distrust 
of state courts to protect federal rights.45 Thus, section 1983 provided 
a "federal remedy ... supplementary to the state remedy," because the 
"state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in 
practice." 
That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce 
the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the disorders 
existing, and in fact that the preservation of life and property in many 
sections of the country is beyond the power of the State government, is a 
sufficient reason why Congress should, so far as they have authority 
under the Constitution, enact the laws necessary for the protection of 
citizens of the United States.46 
Therefore, it is at best ironic, and at worst completely disingenu-
41. Compare Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (federal rights need to be enforced in federal courts 
because state courts might not enforce those rights) with Huffman, 420 U.S. at 610-11 (because 
state and federal courts are equally bound to uphold constitutional rights, the Court refuses to 
assume that state courts will fail to do so). See also Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining 
a Role for the Federal Judi'ciary, 36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 242 (1988) (Supreme Court relies on 
statements of federal court superiority to expand fuller jurisdiction and on statements of parity to 
restrict it); Currie, supra note 2, at 317, 321 n.30 ("I find Younger's conclusion that a state court 
defense is adequate in a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) particularly difficult to reconcile with 
the holding in Mitchum, [which relied upon] the premise that state courts would not adequately 
protect federal rights."); Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 331 ("I know of no principled justifica-
tion for the coexistence of Monroe and the expansive judicial federalism decisions."). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) authorizes civil suit to redress the deprivation under color of 
state law of any rights secured by the Constitution. It thus creates a cause of action. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1343(a)(3) (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action ... [tolredress the deprivation, under color of any State law ... of any right, privilege or 
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States .... " This statute provides federal 
jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims. 
43. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
44. 365 U.S. at 172-87. 
45. 365 U.S. at 180; 365 U.S. at 193-94 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
46. 365 U.S. at 176 (quoting from the Senate debates during the consideration of the Civil 
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ous, that many of the abstention decisions arise in the context of sec-
tion 1983 cases. Beginning with its decision in Younger v. Harris, 47 the 
Court appears gradually to have abdicated much federal civil rights 
jurisdiction in favor of state court jurisdiction over these cases.48 
Younger held that a federal court hearing a civil rights case could not 
enjoin pending state criminal proceedings involving the same subject 
matter as the federal action.49 Subsequent decisions have extended 
Younger's prohibition to the injunction of state court civil actions, to 
the issuance of federal declaratory relief if a related state case is pend-
ing, and even to the injunction of an action commenced in state court 
after the fed~ral action was begun. 50 Thus, in the very same class of 
cases for which jurisdiction is permitted in Monroe, abstention is now 
largely required under Younger. 
A key ingredient in the Younger cases is the Court's presumption 
that state courts are sufficient to protect federal civil rights. Younger 
abstention allegedly "avoid[s] a duplication of legal proceedings and 
legal sanctions where a single suit would be adequate to protect the 
rights asserled."51 Because "state courts have the solemn responsibil-
ity equally with the federal courts' to safeguard constitutional 
rights,''52 federal action would '"reflec[t] negatively upon the state 
court's ability' to do so."53 Never mind that precisely the opposite 
presumption justified Monroe's expansion of federal jurisdiction in 
civil rights cases in the first place. 
Abstention in diversity cases suffers from the same inconsistency. 
Federal diversity jurisdiction has been criticized widely by judges and 
commentators. 54 In the face of this criticism, however, Congress has 
Rights Act of 1871 (the predecessor to § 1983)); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 
(1972) .. 
47. 401 .U.S. 37 (1971). 
48. See Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 59. 
49. 401 U.S. at 43-54. 
~O. See infra notes 115-35 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of Younger). 
51. 401 U;S. ·at 44. 
52. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 460-61 (1974)). 
53. 431 U.S. at 443 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462). 
54. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("I 
speak as one who has long favored the entire abolition of diversity jurisdiction."); Bratton, Dfrer-
sity Jurisdiction - An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 349 (1976) ("there are 
compelling reasons .to advocate the elimination of diversity jurisdiction - given the nature of the 
federal system and the dramatic increase in the workload of federal courts"); Rowe, Abolishing 
Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential/or Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
963 (1979); see also Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 
MICJ!. L. REV. 311, 311 nn.l-2 (1980). 
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declined to eliminate or modify substantially diversity jurisdiction. 55 
The premise of diversity jurisdiction is that out-of-state litigants might 
be subject to bias in state courts, and that a federal trial forum there-
fore is needed. Supreme Court diversity decisions recognize and rely 
upon this concern about state court bias. 56 
Despite the fear of state court bias? the Court has ordered federal 
abstention in a number of diversity cases. As in the civil rights con-
text, abstention has been justified on grounds of federalism and com-
ity. For example, in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern 
Railway Co., 57 the Court ordered abstention in favor of state court 
review of a state administrative order prohibiting discontinuance of a 
certain rail passenger service, stating that "[fjew public interests have 
a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the 
avoidance of needless friction with state policies."58 Thus, the "usual 
rule of comity" required abstention, despite the fact that the federal 
plaintiff was an out-of-state citizen, and even one who sought to raise a 
federal question. 59 
What about the bias of state courts that diversity was designed to 
avoid? Here, too, the Court simply took the opposite position. The 
Southern Railway Court flatly stated, "[a]s adequate state court review 
of an administrative order based upon predominantly local factors is 
available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for 
the protection of federal rights. " 60 If this generally were true, however, 
it would be difficult to see the need for diversity jurisdiction in the first 
place. 
· The inconsistency between cases approving the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction and those ordering abstention is not limited to ·Civil rights 
or diversity jurisdiction cases. Southern Railway,. for example, was a 
federal question case as well as a diversity case.61 Federal questi.on 
55. See Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note l, a't 104 ("Congress has consistently re-
fused to abolish or even limit the scope of the diversity grant."). 
56. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) ("[d]iversity jurisdiction is 
founded on assurance to nonresiaent litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local 
bias"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) ("The constitution has 
presumed ... that state [prejudices] might sometimes obstruct, or control ... the regular admin-
istration of justice."); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 ·u.s. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) 
("[The Constitution] entertains apprehensions [about possible bias against out-of-state litigants 
and therefore] has established national tribunals 'for the decision of controversies between .•. 
citizens of different states."): See generally Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 
41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (1928). . 
57. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). 
58. 341 U.S. at 350 (quoting Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)). 
59. 341 U.S. at 350. 
60. 341 U.S. at _349 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).· 
61. The plaintiffs in Southern Railway argued that.the state, by preventing them from discon-
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jurisdiction exists, in part, to permit resolution of federal claims in 
federal courts, avoiding presumably less sympathetic state courts. 62 
Yet, abstention in federal question cases relies upon exactly the oppo-
site presumption. Moreover, the same inconsistency pervades more 
specialized grants of federal jurisdiction. For example, in several In-
dian water rights cases brought by the United States and by the Indian 
tribes under federal jurisdiction granted by Congress to permit federal 
interests to be protected in federal court, 63 the Supreme Court none-
theless required abstention to permit orderly resolution of the claims 
in state court. 64 As for the denial of a federal forum in which to pro-
tect federal rights, the Court said only that "state courts, as much as 
federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law."65 
Once one focuses on this inconsistency, the abstention doctrines 
seem particularly perverse as applied. Because the Court justifies ab-
stention on comity and federalism grounds, the greater the state inter-
est in a given dispute, the greater the propriety of abstention under the 
Court's approach. In diversity cases, for example, the Court has held 
that abstention is most appropriate when important state policies are 
at Stake. 66 Younger abstention likewise has been held to be most ap-
propriate in criminal cases and in civil cases where the state has a 
particularly strong interest in the outcome. 67 In these cases, the claim 
of a federal right generally is juxtaposed against the state's interests 
asserted to justify abstention. 68 Where the state's interest in the out-
tinning nonprofitable rail service, was confiscating their property in violation of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 341 U.S. at 343. 
62. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[One] reason Congress conferred original federal question jurisdiction 
on the [federal] courts was its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of federal rights."); 
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 591 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1864) ("The reasonableness of 
the agency of the national courts, in cases in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be 
impartial, speaks for itself."); Currie, supra note 2, at 328 (federal question jurisdiction rests 
upon "fear of state court hostility to or misunderstanding of federal rights"). 
63. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
64. 424 U.S. at 817-20. 
65. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983). 
66. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) 
(state's interest in having its own courts construe an ambiguous state statute concerning condem-
nation justifies federal abstention); Alabama Pub. Serv. Commn. v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 
341, 349-50 (1951) (state's interest in regulating local utilities warrants abstention); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 331-33 (1943) (state's interest in establishing a coherent policy with 
respect to regulation of oil fields, a matter of public concern, justifies abstention). 
67. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) ("application of Younger 
abstention [is warranted] if the state's interests in the proceeding are ... important"); see also 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (Congress, in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act, has 
recognized that states have a great interest in "[trying] state cases free from interference by 
federal courts"). 
68. In Younger, for example, the plaintiff's first amendment claim was juxtaposed against the 
state's interest in trying criminal cases free from federal interference. 401 U.S. at 49-54; see also 
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come of the dispute is very high, however, so is the potential for state 
court bias against the federal claimant, because a finding of merit in 
the federal claimant's constitutional claim often will defeat the state 
prosecution or enforcement effort. Thus, while the very rationale for 
federal jurisdiction is a concern about bias, the Court requires absten-
tion in those cases where bias against federal claims is most likely. 69 
A plaintiff who has been inspired by the Monroe rhetoric concern-
ing the insensitivity of state courts to federal rights and who has been 
led by it to file suit in federal court may be justifiably perplexed to find 
herself bounced into state court by application of the abstention doc-
trines. Perplexity turns to true wonder upon reading the abstention 
rhetoric that state courts are as sensitive as federal courts to federal 
rights. 70 Perhaps most irritating of all, however, is that the Court 
seemingly has not recognized, let alone made an attempt to reconcile, 
these two contradictory lines of authority. 
Reconciliation could be attained by observing that the Court sim-
ply has changed its mind on the initial question of whether state courts 
can be trusted to vindicate federal rights. There are a number of ways 
in which this change could be understood. One explanation may be 
that some Justices believe that although federal courts once were nec-
essary to protect federal rights, state courts now are as sensitive as 
federal courts to federal rights.71 Alternatively, there may have been a 
shift in perceived values: the desire to expand the reach of federal 
rights may have given way to a belief that the Court has identified 
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (plaintiff's first 
amendment claim balanced against state's interest in a state bar disciplinary action); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (plaintiff's§ 1983 claim weighed against state's interest in enforcing a 
civil contempt order against the plaintiff); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (plain-
tiff's first amendment rights juxtaposed against state's interest in a "quasi-criminal" nuisance 
action). 
69. See Althouse, supra note 2, at 1083 ("ironically,'' the Court requires abstention in the 
very cases where fear of bias resulting from state's interest "propels" state court defendants into 
federal court; arguing that Pennzoil was an appropriate case for abstention because such state 
bias was not present). 
70. See supra note 38 (concerning Supreme Court statements that state courts are as sensitive 
as federal courts to federal rights). But see Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 86 
("[B]ecause the drafters of section 1983 were especially concerned with the good faith of the state 
courts, it is unlikely that they assumed that the ability to raise a federal defense in state court 
constituted an adequate remedy."). 
71. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 
(1976), noted that while there might have been an "unsympathetic attitude to federal constitu-
tional claims [on the part) of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that 
there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the [state 
courts]." See also Davies, supra note 2; at 31 ("state courts' hostility to federal rights has greatly 
diminished [since the 1960s]''); Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 312 ("[T)he divisive events and 
issues of the sixties are largely behind us . . . . State courts are habituated to the new rights, and 
they are staffed with judges who learned about the new rules in law school and do not consider 
them such an offensive intrusion on state prerogatives as their fathers did."). 
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basic federal rights which now are respected. Increasingly, according 
to these Justices, civil rights litigation is about "less important" or 
"less fundamental" rights than were at stake in prior cases. 72 Once it 
is assumed that the federal rights at stake are "less important," the 
federalism and comity interests take on greater relative importance, 
and the balance shifts in favor of litigation in state courts out of defer-
ence to these principles. 73 
Another possibility is that some segment of the Court believes that 
although state courts are not now quite as sensitive as federal courts, 
the state courts would develop such sensitivity if trusted more often 
with federal cases. 74 Thus, some short-term loss in protection of fed-
eral rights would in the long run benefit the federal system. 
Finally, the explanation may be simply that the membership of the 
Court has shifted, with a concomitant shift in emphasis. 75 The civil 
rights cases, for example, were decided at the height of the Warren 
Court. Few of the members of that Court remain. 76 A clear majority 
of today's Rehnquist Court were appointed by presidents who avow-
edly sought more conservative Justices with greater tendencies to defer 
to state prerogatives, particularly vis-a-vis federal rights.77 Arguably, 
this change in the Court's composition has led to a shift in the resolu-
tion of competing values where federal juris<;liction is concerned.78 
72. See, for example, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), in which the plaintiff, a state 
prisoner, brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against prison officials for destroying a hobby 
kit worth $23.50. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that§ 1983 did not apply lest 
all state torts become cognizable as constitutional violations. 
73. See Davies, supra note 2, at 25 (the Warren Court "allowed enormous federal interven-
tion in state activity" but the abstention doctrines have been "revitalized [out of deference] to 
state court adjudication of cases in which states have a strong interest"); Soifer & Macgill, The 
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1977) 
(Younger abstention is a result of the Court's new "policy oflimiting federal judicial power to the 
advantage of the states"); id. at 1215 (Younger may be "a doctrine merely of accommodation of a 
variety of agendas"); Wells, Disparity, supra note l, at 327 (by relying on "comity," the Court 
can "enforce changes in their perception of the proper balance to be drawn between the values 
underlying competing state and individual claims"). 
74. See Bator, supra note 2, at 627 (state courts should be given the opportunity to hear 
constitutional claims, for in the long run this will make the state courts more effective vindicators 
of federal rights); Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1129 ("[I]f significant constitutional cases were 
forced into state courts more frequently, state judges would acquire greater ••• sensitivity (to] 
constitutional rights ...• (O]ver time the competence gap [between federal and state courts as 
vindicators of federal constitutional rights] might diminish ..•• "). 
75. See Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 335 ("Whether the process of restricting federal 
judicial power continues may depend on such fortuities as which Justices leave the Court first 
and who wins the next presidential election."). 
76. Of the nine Justices on the Court at the time Monroe v. Pape was decided in 1961, only 
two - Justices Brennan and White - remain. 
77. See Davies, supra note 2, at 25 (Warren era marked by belief that role of federal courts is 
to protect rights, while Burger Court believed in deferring to state courts). 
78. Professor Chemerinsky takes this argument a step further, suggesting "that all of the 
discussion about parity really might be a subterfuge; conservatives who believe that state courts 
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Although some combination of these speculative explanations may 
reflect the "real reason" for the differing assumptions underlying the 
jurisdiction and abstention cases, there are a number of reasons why 
this type of answer is not completely satisfying. First, although this 
answer seems obvious in the context of the civil rights cases, it is a bit 
less so in other areas of federal jurisdiction. For example, the frustra-
tion on the part of the Court with diversity jurisdiction has been fairly 
persistent. 79 Moreo':'er, the decisions requiring abstention in diversity 
cases tend to predate the cases requiring abstention in the civil rights 
area. This suggests that the abstention decisions cannot be fully ex-
plained by changes in the Court's sentiment or membership.so 
Second, even if as a factual matter state courts are now more sensi-
tive to federal rights than they were previously, this explanation for 
the abstention doctrines does not address Professor Redish's argument 
that it is for Congress rather than the Court to determine the extent of 
federal court jurisdiction. 81 In the cases expanding federal jurisdic-
tion, such as Monroe, the Court relied specifically on Congress' intent 
to provide a federal forum in order to avoid state courts that might be 
insensitive or hostile to federal claims. 82 Under a traditional separa-
tion-of-powers analysis, it would be for Congress, and not the Court, 
to observe the change in state sensitivity and to respond through ap-
propriate legislation. s3 
Third, the Court has not gone so far as to overrule any of its juris-
dic.tional decisions, creating frustrating uncertainty and constant liti-
gation about the right of access to a federal forum. For example, 
current doctrine holds that Monroe, which expanded the reach of fed-
are more likely to favor the government over the individual may simply be using the parity 
argument as a tool to achieve their"ideological agenda." Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 253. 
79. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, ·J. dissenting) ("I 
[have] long favored the entire abolition of diversity jurisdiction"); Redish, Separation of Powers, 
supra note 1, at 104 (the Supreme Court, due to its dissatisfaction with diversity jurisdiction, has 
"developed principles of questionable logic that function only to serve the thinly-veiled goal of 
curbing the scope of the diversity grant"); see also supra note 54. 
80. Bulford, for example, .was decided in 1943, 'tong before the civil rights movement gained 
any real steam. Moreover, mixed in among the restrictive .Younger decisions of recent years are 
cases broadening federal relief, such as those expancling municipal liability to plaintiffs injured by 
unconstitutional conduct. See generally Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 73. 
81. See supra notes 30-31 and· accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. . 
83. See Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 111-12. Justice Brennan has also ex-
pressed this view. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("The crystal clarity of the congressional decision and purpose in adopting§ 1983 ... expose[s] 
[today's abstention] decision as [a] deliberate and conscious flouting[] of a decision Congress was 
constitutionally empowered to make.'.'); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 616 (1975) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Section 1983] serves a particular congressional objective long recog-
nized and enforced by the Court. Today's [decision] will defeat that objective."). 
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eraljurisdiction, remains good law; the Younger cases curtail Monroe's 
reach, but do not overrule it. If the premises of cases like Younger are 
correct, however, the logical underpinnings of cases like Monroe are 
destroyed, suggesting that these cases could, and perhaps should, be 
overruled. 84 By failing to overrule them, the Court leaves the law go-
ing in two directions at once. 85 
Finally, although there is a temptation to attribute the conflicting 
lines of authority to changed circumstances, and consider the job 
done, this does nothing to address the doctrinal confusion facing 
courts and litigants in abstention cases. Whatever the scholarly incli-
nation to explain judicial decisions with regard to shifting political be-
liefs, judges and lawyers continue to express themselves in doctrinal, 
precedential terms. Scholars fight over what "really" accounts for a 
given decision while judges continue to sit at their desks and write 
opinions that, even if only purportedly, apply principles established in 
prior cases. 86 The scholarly resolution of the conflict, therefore, does 
little for the rest of the legal world, which continues to take precedent 
at face value. 
It is now almost thirty years since Monroe and twenty years since 
Younger. The question is whether it is now possible, with a bird's eye 
view of changing conceptions of federal jurisdiction, to merge the 
competing lines of authority. The next section of this article estab-
lishes the basis for a revisionist theory of the abstention doctrines and 
explains how the theory would operate. The succeeding section then 
shows how prior precedent can be interpreted consistent with this new 
theory. 
II. THE REVISIONIST THEORY 
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Revisionist Theory 
The revisionist theory envisions an abstention doctrine that explic-
itly does a more sensitive job than does the traditional theory of recon-
ciling the competing demands for the exercise of federal or state 
84. True, Monroe's grounding in congressional intent would make such an overruling awk-
ward. But, after all, Monroe came almost 100 years after§§ 1983 and 1343 were enacted. The 
Court could decide that Monroe simply was wrong. See Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 331-34 
(asking why the Court has not overruled Monroe in light of subsequent cases like Younger). 
85. Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 331 ("I know of no principled justification for the coex-
istence of Monroe and the expansive judicial federalism cf'ecisions (based on Younger]"). 
86. Compare Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 37 Mo. L. REV. 2, 5 
(1979) ("Professors have, for many years, astonished students with their perceptive re-rational-
izations of the cases.") with Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
4 (1983) ("In [Supreme Court] conference deliberation precedents regularly provide the basis for 
analysis and discussion."). See also Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1990). 
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jurisdiction. The revisionist theory begins with the premise, central to 
abstention's critics, that it is the role of the Supreme Court to ensure a 
federal forum to vindicate federal rights. Recognizing, however, that 
not every case requires a federal trial forum to protect federal rights, 
the revisionist theory permits consideration of other factors that miti-
gate in favor of deference to state proceedings when federal interests 
are not threatened or can be protected by direct review of state court 
decisions by the Supreme Court. The revisionist theory seeks to cut 
with a scalpel where the Court has, at least on the face of its decisions, 
cut with a cleaver. 
The problem with the arguments raised against abstention is that, 
even admitting that federal review is necessary to vindicate federal 
rights, for the most part these arguments prove too much. Absten-
tion's critics maintain it is wholly inappropriate to deny a federal trial 
forum once such a forum has been granted by Congress to protect 
federal rights and interests. 87 But not every case falling within con-
gressionally granted jurisdiction presents the concerns that motivated 
Congress to grant or expand federal jurisdiction. In some cases, 
although lower federal court jurisdiction exists, federal interests can be 
vindicated through other channels without exercising that jurisdiction. 
First, assuming that a federal forum is necessary to protect a fed-
eral right, the lower federal courts are not the only federal fora avail-
able for this purpose. The Supreme Court can, of course, also serve 
this function by direct review of state-court adjudication of federal 
claims. 88 . Some commentators have persuasively argued that the 
Supreme Court cannot provide sufficient federal review in all cases 
raising federal claims, calling into question Congress' power to elimi-
nate the lower federal courts. 89 As convincing as aspects of this argu-
ment are, however, the argument does not establish the converse: that 
87. See, e.g., Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 110 ("[t]he courts may not ignore 
... congressional policy decisions"); Soifer and Macgill, supra note 73, at 1142 ("the Court has 
elected a policy apparently inconsistent with legislative command"); see also supra notes 30-31 
and accompanying text. 
88. For a critical look at this question, see infra notes 300-17 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the adequacy of direct review by the Supreme Court). 
89. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note l, at 510-13 (footnotes omitted): 
The Supreme Court is clearly no longer capable [as a result of its increasing caseload] of 
providing a federal forum to hear the merits of every case involving a federal question ... . 
[Consequently] the lower courts have become the primary vindicators of federal rights ... . 
It can now be asserted that their existence is in some form constitutionally required. 
Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 68 (1981) (arguing that manipulating lower federal court 
jurisdiction is an unconstitutional attempt to undo the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine). 
See generally Wells, Abstention, supra note 2, at 1129 ("To assign Congress exclusive control over 
federal remedies for constitutional violations ... is to give a majoritarian branch of government 
absolute control over the assertion of anti-majoritarian rights."). 
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the Supreme Court is an inadequate initial federal forum in every case. 
In fact, arguments that Congress could not now abolish the lower fed-
eral courts stem not from a concern for affording a federal trial forum, 
but from a concern for adequate federal review. In some cases, the 
Supreme Court may provide such review.9o 
Second, a federal forum is neither necessary nor appropriate in 
every case in which federal jurisdiction currently lies. Just as some 
cases may be moved from state to federal court to protect federal inter-
ests, state interests may suggest that certain cases should be "re-
moved" to state court. Although the presence of state interests alone 
ought not to justify federal abstention, if abstention is possible without 
doing any damage to federal interests, then deference to state proceed-
ings is entirely appropriate.91 
Third, unless there is nothing to the federalism and comity argu-
ments advanced by the Court in favor of abstention, sweeping all cases 
falling under the head of federal jurisdiction into federal court may 
threaten interests essential to the smooth operation of a government 
organized around dual sovereigns with coordinate court systems. 
90. See infra notes 300-17 and accompanying text. This point is made quite well in Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), in which the United States 
sued in federal district court for a declaration of water rights. The United States, which had 
previously asserted its water rights in state court, brought this suit in federal district court 
against some 1000 water users. 424 U.S. at 800. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, 
held that the federal district court should dismiss the suit in favor of the ongoing state court 
proceeding. Justice Stevens argued forcefully in dissent that the Court inappropriately was de-
priving the United States of a right to litigate in its own courts: "[T]he Federal Government 
surely has no lesser right of access to the federal forum than does a private litigant, such as an 
Indian asserting his own claim." 424 U.S. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But it is hardly accu-
rate to say that the United States was deprived of a federal forum. Should the eventual result in 
state court turn out to be unacceptable to the United States, it could always seek review in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. As Justice Stewart, also dissenting, admitted, "federal judicial review of 
the state courts' resolution of issues of federal law will be possible . . . by this Court in the 
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction." 424 U.S. at 826 (Stewart, J., dissenting). And, as anyone 
familiar with Supreme Court litigation knows, if the United States were to request plenary review 
in that instance, it almost certainly would be granted. See 424 U.S. at 812-13 (commenting on 
the adequacy of federal review). 
It is true that on its facts Colorado River is a somewhat novel case. Not every litigant has the 
same claim upon Supreme Court resources as does the United States. The point, however, is that 
if cases exist where the possibility of direct review by the Supreme Court could adequately pro-
tect federal interests, and if those cases can be identified and categorized, then in those cases at 
least a federal trial forum is less important to obtaining federal review. 
91. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), for example, 
the defendant power company removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction to 
challenge a municipality's authority under state Jaw to condemn property. The federal district 
court stayed its hand to permit the state supreme court to rule on what was an important, un-
resolved question of state law, and the Supreme Court approved abstention. That decision was 
appropriate, for Thibodaux involved a state-Jaw issue of great importance to the state that could 
be decided in state court without threatening federal interests. The grant of diversity jurisdiction 
was intended to avoid the bias of state courts, but such bias was unlikely to affect the decision in 
Thibodaux because it involved a pure question of law that would have widespread applicability to 
state citizens and noncitizens alike. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. 
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There is bound to be serious friction in a dual court system where the 
federal courts - while mouthing platitudes about coequal responsibil-
ity - nonetheless consistently trump efforts of the state courts.92 
Friction resulting from a genuine need to protect federal interests and 
rights can be understood as a necessary part of our federal system.93 
Friction that results from the exercise of unnecessarily broad federal 
jurisdiction, however, cannot be so justified. 
Moreover, unnecessary friction ultimately takes its toll on the abil-
ity of federal courts to protect federal rights. Restraint enhances 
power.94 Although in other contexts the propriety ~f the exercise of 
the "passive virtues" has been contested hotly,95 these concerns seem 
to carry weight in the area of federal abstention. 96 The increased fed-
eralization of claims threatens to cheapen the special nature of federal 
court jurisdiction by making every state court matter a "federal 
case."97 Again, this concern should not drive the Court to refuse juris-
diction in cases where it is necessary to protect federal interests, but if 
such cases can be separated from others where federal jurisdiction 
does not play such a role, the federal courts could avoid the lessened 
status that might follow from· over-involvement in mill-run 
litigation. 98 
The revisionist theory of abstention advanced here proceeds from 
the notion that although congressional jurisdictional grants, and 
Supreme Court interpretation of those grants, sweep quite broadly, the 
Court uses the abstention doctrines to effect a sensitive allocation of 
cases between the federal and state courts, ensuring the exercise of 
92. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427 (1979) (quoting Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)) (abstention is a way of avoiding "the friction [between federal and state 
courts caused by] a premature constitutional adjudication"). 
93. See Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 77 (argument that federal decision unnecessarily dis-
rupts state program must rest on assumption that federal decision is wrong; otherwise, disruption 
is warranted). 
94. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) (on the "passive 
virtues"). 
95. See, e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ''Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
96. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 578 (arguing that Bickel's concerns carry special weight 
with regard to lower federal court jurisdiction). But see Field, Abstention Today, supra note 2, at 
603 (arguing exactly the opposite). 
97. Cf. Neubome, supra note 2, at 1125 ("Distance from the pressures and emotions gener-
ated by the application of constitutional doctrine is conducive to a generous reading and vigorous 
enforcement of constitutional rights."); Yackle, supra note 2, at 1031-32 ("The overriding re-
sponsibility of the state courts to carry out state law thus deprives them of the neutrality and 
dispassion demanded for contemporaneous enforcement of the fourteenth amendment."). 
98. See Eisenberg, supra note l, at 515 ("An overabundance of federal forums with un-
restricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases could ... undermine the judiciary."). 
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federal jurisdiction only where necessary to vindicate federal rights.99 
Despite persistent assertions that the abstention doctrines wrongfully 
have deprived federal plaintiffs of federal fora, the results in abstention 
decisions can be read to support the conclusion that the Court has 
been using those doctrines to achieve just such a sensitive allocation. 
The abstention doctrines permit the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
where a federal trial forum is necessary to protect federal interests and 
rights. When legitimate state interests are present, however, and the 
case can be resolved in state court without threatening federal interests 
- either because no important federal interest is at stake or because 
direct review by the Supreme Court is adequate to the task - absten-
tion is required to permit the state courts to resolve the issues. 
B. How the Revisionist Theory Should Operate 
The premise of any model of abstention is that a plaintiff has cho-
sen to file suit in federal court in a matter over which the lower federal 
court has been granted jurisdiction by Congress. The question is 
whether the case should proceed in federal court, or whether some 
other sufficiently strong consideration mitigates in favor of overriding 
the plaintiff's choice. The revisionist theory presupposes that the deci-
sion whether to honor a plaintiff's choice to proceed in state or federal 
court is based on a concern that federal jurisdiction lie when necessary 
to vindicate federal rights, but that abstention is appropriate when sig-
nificant state interests exist and the federal interest is de minimis, or 
could be protected by Supreme Court review. 
Under the revisionist theory, three basic forum decisions are neces-
sary. Each of these decisions is made on the basis of several rather 
sensible considerations. The three questions are (1) whether the na-
ture of the case is such that judicious use of federal resources and con-
cern for legitimate state interests nonetheless mandate resolution of 
the case as an initial matter in a lower federal court in order to protect 
federal rights; (2) whether, if the case instead is resolved as an initial 
matter in state court, the state judicial system provides an adequate 
means of raising and preserving for Supreme Court review any federal 
question in the case; and (3) whether direct review by the Supreme 
Court of federal questions resolved by the state courts is likely to be 
99. Professor Yackle also has suggested that these concerns should drive application of the 
abstention doctrines. See Yackle, supra note 2, at 1042 ("The forum-allocation question should 
tum ... on a reasoned determination of whether and when the federal courts should be open to 
resolve litigants' disputes ... . ");see also Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1116 ("(Abstention is] an 
allocative device designed to promote the sharing of responsibility in federal litigation with state 
courts ..•. "). 
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adequate to protect federal interests. Each of these questions is ad-
dressed in tum. 
1. Necessity of an Initial Federal Forum 
The first consideration is whether a federal trial forum is necessary 
to protect a federal right. Often this will depend upon whether protec-
tion of the federal right turns upon questions of fact. 100 If fact-finding 
is not important, as in the case of a facial challenge to a state statute, 
direct Supreme Court review of the state decision may be adequate. 
On the other hand, if proof of the denial of a federal right turns on 
factual issues, such as in the case of an allegedly coerced confession, 
presentation of the question to a federal trial forum may be necessary. 
There are two reasons for this. First, state bias on the merits of the 
issue may color fact-finding by the state court with regard to the fed-
eral right. 101 Second, compounding the first danger, it is particularly 
difficult for the Supreme Court to provide meaningful review of lower-
court fact-finding. 102 
Related to this first consideration is the nature of the federal right 
asserted. Some federal claims of right - e.g., property and economic 
liberty - pose less of a constraint on state regulation than do other 
federal rights, which require strict scrutiny of the state basis for regu-
lation.103 Thus, the Court would want, if such a fine division were 
100. Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1083 ("the judge who finds the facts can 
alter the ultimate result in a case"); Neubome, supra note 2, at 1119 ("[l]n many constitutional 
cases, the fact finding process plays a critical role in the resolution of the controversy."). 
101. See Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1083 ("Bias against federal claims may 
not be widespread among state court judges, but the ease with which the judge who finds the 
facts can alter the ultimate result in such a case makes such a bias particularly difficult to guard 
against without original federal jurisdiction."). 
102. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964): 
[Supreme Court] review ... is an inadequate substitute for the initial District Court determi-
nation •.. to which the litigant is entitled in the federal courts . . . . [T]his is especially true 
as to issues of fact . . . . The possibility of appellate review by this Court of a state court 
determination may not be substituted, against a party's wishes, for his. right to litigate his 
federal claims fully in the federal courts. 
Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REv. 717, 759 (1986) 
("the need for a federal fact finder [is not easily met] by the prospect of Supreme Court review 
alone"); Davies, supra note 2, at 29 ("The Supreme Court cannot perform this review function 
for decisions coming up from state courts due to its narrow capacity for factual review .... "); 
Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1083-84 ("[T]he possibility of Supreme Court review 
as the sole federal input [in state cases will not] adequately protect the federal interests .... 
[W]hen the Court does grant a full hearing, it typically will not review the factual determinations 
that state courts have made."); Yackle, supra note 2, at 1023 ("Appellate review does not substi-
tute for the trial level resolution of factual disputes."). 
103. See G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (11th ed. 1985) (noting the "Court's 
stance of extreme deference to economic regulation [by the states]"). Compare Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (granting the State of Oklahoma great leeway in regulating 
local businesses) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that states may not pass laws 
that interfere with a woman's right to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy); 
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possible, to retain federal jurisdiction in cases where federal rights call 
for strong federal protection, while leaving to state courts those cases 
in which the federal claim of right generally provides the state greater 
leeway for regulation. 
The Court would also want to consider the basis for the state's 
asserted interest in resolving a given case in state court. There are 
cases in which federal adjudication presents very real difficulties for 
the state. For example, if the primary question in a case is one that 
involves an unsettled question of state law with broad application, ab-
stention might be appropriate to avoid federal resolution of the state 
law question different from the decision the highest state court would 
render if given the chance.104 This particularly would be the case if 
federal interests are not threatened by state court resolution of the case 
or issue. 105 
Another consideration is the extent to which exercising federal ju-
risdiction might involve the federal courts in deciding numerous cases 
commonly viewed as mill-run state court litigation. The lower federal 
courts should not be fio0ded with cases that do not really require the 
prestige or resources of the federal bench.106 
Finally, in a related vein, the Court would want to use abstention 
to avoid requiring the district courts to make premature decisions on 
the merits of unsettled federal questions, particularly constitutional 
questions. This tactic is nothing but an application of the familiar 
Ashwander doctrine.101 If a certain class of cases may be channeled to 
the lower state courts for a decision on state law grounds, thus remov-
ing the need for a decision by the federal court on federal constitu-
tional grounds, abstention in favor of state court jurisdiction might be 
see also Wells, Comity, supra note 2, at 77 (arguing that business regulation cases require lesser 
federal review, and justifying the Burford line of cases on this ground). 
104. See, e.g .. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-30 (1979) (it is important to allow state 
courts the opportunity to decide state law issues); England, 375 U.S. at 415 ("[S]tate courts [are] 
the final expositors of state law."); see also Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1084-85 (it 
is appropriate to allow state courts to resolve state law issues in certain cases); Redish, Separation 
of Powers, supra note l, at 95 ("Ideally, the state courts should be given the first opportunity to 
provide a definitive construction of an ambiguous state statute."). 
105. See Wells, Disparity, supra note l, at 308-10 (when the plaintiff seeking a federal forum 
has a weak federal interest, like protection of economic rights, and the state has a high counter-
vailing interest in regulation, state court is the most appropriate forum). 
106. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) 
("This Court has an abundance of important work to do, which, if it is to be done well, should 
not be subject to the added pressures of non-urgent state cases which the federal courts have 
never been called on to resolve."); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 515 ("An overabundance of federal 
forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases could in fact undermine the 
judiciary."). 
107. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
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appropriate in these cases as well. 108 
2. Adequacy of the State Court Forum 
Having tentatively determined to remove a case from a federal trial 
forum, the next inquiry is whether the alternative path of initial state 
court adjudication, followed, if necessary, by direct- Supreme Court 
review, is adequate to protect ariy federal illterest in the case .. Perhaps 
the most obvious forum decision, therefore, is assessing whether the 
state provides a vehicle for raising fed~ral daims in s~te court. 1~9 If 
not, abstention is inappropriate. 
3. Adequacy of Direct Review 
Finally, it is necessary to assess whether the Supreme Court ade-
quately can review the work of the state courts in order to protect 
federal interests. Even if the state provides a forum in which_ to raise 
the federal claim, the case probably should be resolved in federal dis-
trict court if the Supreme. Court cannot effectively review state deter-
minations with regard to the claimed federal right. 
In large part this issue could be resolved by considering the extent 
to which resolution of the federal issue turns on questions of fact. If ' 
the federal issue essentially involves a question of law, it would be 
more easily addressed by the Court on direct review ~han would an 
issue that turns heavily upon factual determinations. 110 For example, 
facial challenges to a statute present easier candidates for adequate 
direct review than challenges to statutes as applied. Therefore, if the 
108. Several cases advocate this justification for abstention. See, e.g., Railroad Commn. v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) ("Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided 
if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy."); City of Meridian v. 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 641 (1959) ("In such a case, when the state court's 
interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate 
any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its 
hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily."). 
109. The Supreme Court has made just this point in a number of cases, although not explic-
itly in the context of the revisionist theory. Under the traditional approach, abstention would be 
inappropriate if the state provided no forum, on the theory that the litigant is entitled to some 
forum in which to raise the federal claim. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 
(1975) (holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate where the plaintiffs sought to challenge 
the constitutionality of their pre-trial detention and where the plaintiffs did not have an opportu-
nity to raise their federal claim in the state courts); see also Collins, supra note 2, at 68 ("when 
the state system forbids raising the federal issue that requires a prompt decision in an ongoing 
state court lawsuit, [abstention is inappropriate]"). 
The same rule would obtain under the revisionist theory, but for a different reason. Absten-
tion is inappropriate under the revisionist theory if the state provides no forum because then the 
Supreme Court would never have an opportunity to review the issue; access to a federal forum to 
resolve the federal claim would be completely c:ut off. In those cases, immediate access to a lower 
federal court would be necessary. · · 
110. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
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two types of cases could be distinguished, abstention would be less 
appropriate in the case of the "as applied" challenge, and more appro-
priate in the case of a facial challenge. 
Moreover, the Court needs to take into account the volume of 
cases that arise presenting a certain issue. If an issue arises only peri-
odically, the Court might be more able to handle it on direct review. 
Often this consideration will coincide with the fact/law consideration: 
facial challenges to a statute will arise far less frequently than "as ap-
plied" challenges. This allocation also makes sense to the extent that 
facial challenges will probably have a broader impact than "as ap-
plied" challenges, making them excellent candidates for Supreme 
Court exposition.111 
This last factor illustrates an important point about the operation 
of the entire scheme. The forum decisions cannot be made indepen-
dently of one another: often several factors will compete or overlap. 
If an issue will arise frequently, either the lower federal courts or the 
Supreme Court ultimately must bear the burden of review. Given that 
reality, a decision must be made between the two based on some other 
factor such as the extent to which fact-finding is important. In short, 
taking pressure off of one part of the system necessarily means placing 
it somewhere else. 
Therefore, the revisionist theory recognizes that the question is, to 
some extent, one of resource allocation. Although it is possible to en-
vision a system that allocates every case presenting a federal issue to 
an initial federal trial forum, such a system would present serious diffi-
culties not only for federalism and comity concerns, but also for those 
concerned with the practical realities of federal caseloads and the pres-
tige of the federal courts. 112 The aim, therefore, is to develop an allo-
cation of cases between the state and federal courts that minimizes the 
difficulties presented by such review. The revisionist theory has a spe-
cial appeal because, unlike the traditional approach, it allows for this 
allocation in fairly explicit terms. 
111. Professor Yackte points out that a major factor in the Supreme Court's decision to hear 
a case is the national significance of the issue. Yackle, supra note 2, at 1022 n.137. Because the 
impact of a facial challenge is broader than an "as-applied" challenge, they tend to have greater 
statewide or national significance; facial challenges are therefore more appropriate for Supreme 
Court review. 
112. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1128-29 ("[B]y urging a broad option to invoke federal 
jurisdiction, ... lawyers exacerbate an already difficult caseload burden in the federal courts •••• 
[A] failure to remedy the overburdening of the federal trial courts threatens precisely [their] 
capacity for excellence."); see also infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text. 
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III. THE THEORY APPLIED TO CASES 
This Part seeks to demonstrate that the revisionist theory provides 
a more thorough, and in many ways more satisfactory, explanation for 
the Supreme Court's abstention holdings than the traditional ap-
proach. This demonstration is complicated somewhat by the fact that 
the variety of abstention holdings under the traditional approach de-
fies orderly characterization, making it difficult to group them for pur-
poses of analysis under one revisionist theory. 113 Nonetheless, using 
Younger abstention to provide a framework, progress can be made to-
ward a coherent comparison of the two theories. Younger abstention 
is the appropriate vehicle for providing such a framework because it is 
the abstention doctrine most frequently applied by the Court. As this 
Part demonstrates, the other abstention doctrines merely fill in gaps 
left by Younger. · 
The underlying premise of Younger abstention is that a federal 
court should not interfere in the ongoing proceedings of a state 
court. 114 The doctrine had its inception in Younger v. Harris, 115 which 
held that a federal court could not enjoin an ongoing state criminal 
proceeding.116 Younger spoke only to cases involving injunctive relief. 
It did not address relief other than injunctions, noncriminal cases, or 
cases that were not pending at the time federal jurisdiction was in-
voked.117 Since the time of Younger, however, the Court has arrived 
at a tentative resolution as to whether Younger abstention ought to 
apply to these other types of cases. 
Perhaps the simplest issue for the Court was whether Younger ab-
stention required a federal court to refrain from awarding relief other 
113. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) ("The various types of ab-
stention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they 
reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that 
contemplates parallel judicial processes."); see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 303 ("These 
various doctrines overlap at times, and the courts have not always distinguished them clearly."); 
Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1147 ("Partly because of the confusion of terminol-
cgy, and partly because the limits of the other categories of abstention are largely incoherent, the 
relationships between the various categories are less than clear."). 
114. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) ("Since the beginning of this country's his-
tory Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try 
cases free from interference by federal courts."). 
115. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
116. 401 U.S. at 41. The doctrine has its exceptions: abstention is unwarranted if the state 
action is brought in bad faith or to harass the claimant; if the statute is unconstitutional on its 
face; or ifthere is the threat of immediate and irreparable injury. See 401 U.S. at 53-54. It is rare 
that a case actually falls within a Younger exception, however. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 2, at 
60 (Court has never found a "bad-faith proceeding"); Soifer & Macgill, supra note 73, at 1210 
(Trainor erased the thought that exceptions ever would be found and applied). 
117. See 401 U.S. at 41. 
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than injunctive relief. 118 Even if a federal court may not interfere with 
an ongoing state court proceeding by enjoining it, the award of declar-
atory relief to a federal plaintiff need not be seen as posing the same 
interference because the state court would remain free to proceed to its 
own judgment.119 Nonetheless, in a companion case to Younger, the 
Court made clear that at least in the case of pending state proceedings, 
declaratory relief is as forbidden as injunctive relief. 120 Thus, the gen-
eral rule is that the federal court simply may not proceed in a case if 
118. Under one of the primary rationales for Younger abstention, the equity rationale, there 
was reason to believe that nonequitable relief would be treated differently from equitable relief. 
See 401 U.S. at 43-44 (justifying doctrine on equity principles); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco 
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) ("The first ground for the Younger decision was 'the basic doctrine of 
equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not get to 
restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law.'") (quot-
ing Younger v. Harrjs, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971)). If the requested relief were not equitable in 
nature, then limitations on the grant of equity - e.g., that equity will not intervene where there 
is an adequate remedy at law - arguably would have no place in barring relief. This equity 
rationale for abstention can be seen as early as Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court 
there stated: 
[A]n injunction against a state court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our gov-
ernment. If an injunction against an individual is disobeyed, and he commences proceedings 
before a grand jury or in a court, such disobedience is personal only, and the court or jury 
can proceed without incurring any penalty on that account. 
The difference between the power to enjoin an individual from doing certain things, and 
the power to enjoin courts from proceeding in their own way to exercise jurisdiction is plain, 
and no power to do the latter exists because of a power to do the former. 
209 U.S. at 163. 
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, divorced the equity rationale from the Younger abstention doctrine, insisting that the 
Supreme Court has "consistently required" federal courts to "abide by standards of restraint that 
go well beyond those of priv!lte equity jurisprudence." 420 U.S. at 603. In Hicks v. Miranda, 
422 U.S. 332 (1975), Justice White, writing for the majority, upheld the Younger abstention 
doctrine without referring to the equity rationale at all. See also Middlesex County Ethics 
Commn. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (applying Younger abstention principle 
without any mention of the equity rationale); Wells, Abstention, supra note 2, at 1108 ("As the 
rules 'have evolved, the COurt has relied less and less on equity and instead has stressed values of 
federalism as the basis of these doctrines. Accordingly, the abstention doctrines cannot be justi-
fied in terms of the inherent powers and limitations of a court of equity."). 
119. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has suggested that a federal declaratory judgment 
would not bind the state court in a subsequent proceeding. Steff'el v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 
482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Thus, according to the Chief Justice, if a federal 
pfaintiff obtains a federal declaratory judgment that a state statute was unconstitutional prior to 
violating the statute, and then the state subsequently prosecutes the federal plaintiff in state 
court, the state court then would be free to reach a different conclusion than the federal court 
with regard to the statute's constitutionality. 415 U.S. at 481-83 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
The feoeral declaration of rights, however, would be "highly persuasive." 415 U.S. at 482 n.3 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
120. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that the same principles that gov-
ern the propriety of federal injunctions of state criminal proceedings govern the issuance of fed· 
eral declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings); see also Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (holding similarly for state tax proceedings). 
The Court has declined to rule whether Younger abstention will apply to claims for money 
damages. The Court had the opportunity to decide this issue in Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 
193 (1988), but expressly avoided it. 484 U.S. at 202. There is a split of authority among the 
circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals as to whether Younger applies to a claim for 
damages. The First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that Younger applies to such a case, 
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the state criminal court has jurisdiction of the matter and is 
proceeding. 
Only slightly more complicated was the issue of whether Younger 
applies to noncriminal proceedings. In a series of cases, the Court ap-
plied the federalism and comity rationales of Younger to cases outside 
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, but only where the state. had a 
serious interest.121 The most prominent of these decisions involved . 
civil enforcement actions: federal courts will defer not ollly to pending 
state criminal proceedings, but also to state civil cases in which the 
state (or its representative) is a party plaintiff seeking to exercise coer-
cive authority over a private defendant. Thus, in Huffman v. Pursue, 
Ltd., 122 the Younger doctrine was applied to require federal abstention 
in the face of a state nuisance action brought to enjoin operation of a 
pornographic theater.123 In Trainor v. Hernandez, 124 the Court ap-
plied Younger in a case involving a challenge brought in federal court 
to an attachment procedure invoked by the state in a state court pro-
ceeding to recover allegedly fraudulently obtained welfare benefits.125 
A related question that remained after cases such as Huffman and 
Trainor was whether Younger would be invoked in a civil proceeding 
between two purely private litigants.126 The Court answered the ques-
tion affirmatively in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 127 holding that a fed-
eral court could not entertain ·a challenge to a state appeal-bond 
statute if the same challenge could be raised m state court in a then-
pending private civil action.128 Although· the precise contours of 
Pennzoil's extension of Younger are unclear, the general rule (subject 
to the specific limitations describ.ed below) appears to be that federal 
while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that it do~ not. See 484 U.S. at 208 n.3 (White, J., 
concurring) (reviewing circuit court decisions). 
121. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-35 (1979) (ordering lower federal court not 
to interfere with a pending state court proceeding in which the State of Texas had taken custody 
of the federal plaintiff's children to protect them from alleged child abuse). 
122. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
123. 420 U.S. at 607. 
124. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
125. 431 U.S. at 444. The Court interpreted Huffman to have argued that 
while the traditional maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution strictly speak-
ing did not apply to [a civil enforcement action], the 'more vital consideration' of comity 
counseled restraint as strongly in the context of a penqing state civil enforcement action as 
in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. 
431 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted). 
126. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607; Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444 n.8. 
127. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
128. 481 U.S. at 17. Citing Trainor and Huffman, the Court relied on the nature of the 
state's interest and not the identity of the parties in applying the Younger doctrine. 481 U.S. at 
14 n.12 ("[T]he State of Texas has an interest in this proceeding 'that goes beyond its interest as 
adjudicator of wholly private disputes.'"). 
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courts may not proceed in civil or criminal cases in which a state court 
has jurisdiction and is proceeding.129 
The final Younger issue was whether a federal court should defer 
only to a proceeding that was pending at the time the federal action 
was filed. The answer seems to be that abstention is appropriate even 
beyond that mark. In Hicks v. Miranda, 13o the state filed a criminal 
action against the federal plaintiff after the federal plaintiff brought a 
federal action challenging a state obscenity statute. The Court held 
that so long as the state initiated its state court action before "proceed-
ings of su,bstance on the merits" had begun in federal court, the federal 
court should abstain. 131 Thus, rather than relying upon a pending/ 
nonpending distinction (which is the traditional interpretation of the 
Younger cases), a federal court generally will not exercise jurisdiction 
over a case, criminal or civil, in which the federal defendant has begun 
a state proceeding, or begins one shortly after the federal court pro-
ceeding is initiated.132 
This statement of Younger's applicability undoubtedly seems so 
broad that a few preliminary observations are in order. First, there are 
exceptions.133 Second, Younger cannot apply to certain cases. The 
touchstone of Younger is the possible existence of a state proceeding. 
Such proceedings will not exist in cases where federal removal juris-
diction applies. Thus, for example, federal courts generally will not 
abstain under Younger in diversity cases or cases in which the state 
plaintiff's case presents a federal question or otherwise falls under fed-
eral jurisdiction, because in such cases any state action could be re-
129. But see Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (even if Younger applies, "the 
District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that 
cannot be redressed in the state proceeding"). Deakins is consistent with the revisionist theory 
because in that case the state failed to provide adequate means of addressing the federal concern. 
130. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). 
131. 422 U.S. at 349; see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975) (holding 
that because federal litigation was in an "embryonic stage and no contested matter had been 
decided," the plaintiff's request for an injunction was "squarely governed by Younger"); cf. Stef· 
fel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1974) (holding that where state enforcement of a statute 
has been threatened, but no prosecution is pending, Younger does not require the district court to 
abstain from hearing a constitutional attack on the statute). 
132. See Bator, supra note 2, at 617 n.35: 
It is a disadvantage of the overstated distinction between pending and threatened state pro· 
ceedings that it obscures a distinction which is truly fundamental: the distinction between 
cases in which the plaintiff seeks an anticipatory ruling that future conduct is constitution· 
ally immune from state punishment (or other regulation), and cases in which the plaintiff is 
claiming that past conduct is so immune. In the former case the state enforcement proceed-
ing is by hypothesis not truly "ripe" (although the federal action may be); the violation has 
not yet occurred, and the whole point of the federal action is to obtain an adjudication of the 
federal claim without risking punishment (or regulation) even if the claim is rejected. 
133. See supra note 116. Moreover, Younger will not apply if the state provides no opportu· 
nity to raise the federal claim in the state proceeding. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying 
text. 
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moved to federal court, and thus there would be no state proceeding to 
which the federal court must defer. 134 But, as this section will explain, 
subject to these caveats, Younger is extremely broad.135 
Thus, the universe of abstention possibilities may be divided into 
two categories: one in which Younger abstention is appropriate and 
one in which it is not. Younger abstention generally is appropriate in 
any case in which the federal defendant already has begun a state pro-
ceeding at the time the federal action is commenced, or begins such a 
proceeding shortly after the federal action is filed. Younger abstention 
is inappropriate in any case in which the federal defendant either 
chooses not to file such a state proceeding or cannot do so successfully, 
in that any action so filed will in turn be removed by the federal plain-
tiff back to federal court. 
With this understanding, it is possible to begin to draw a matrix 
with the following vertical division: 
Younger abstention 
appropriate 
(state proceeding) 
FIGURE 1 
Younger abstention 
inappropriate 
(no state proceeding) 
Next, it is necessary to divide this universe horizontally, placing in 
one category cases within the criminal jurisdiction of the state courts, 
and in the other category cases outside that jurisdiction. This division 
is important because cases within the state's criminal jurisdiction are 
subject to federal habeas. corpus review, while those within the civil 
jurisdiction generally are not. 136 The revisionist theory seeks to ensure 
134. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144l(b) (1982) (permitting removal of civil actions involving juris-
diction founded on diversity "if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought"); 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1982) 
(permitting removal of actions against federal officials acting under color of law). For a fuller 
explanation of the relationship between removal and abstention, see infra notes 163-64, 193-96, 
and accompanying text. 
135. See Wells, Disparity, supra note l, at 294-95; Redish, Younger Doctrine, supra note 2, at 
481 (taking Younger's rationale of avoiding offense to state judges and judicial systems to its 
logical conclusion would extend the doctrine to all civil cases and any exceptions would disap-
pear); Soifer & Macgill, supra note 73, at 1164, 1213 (Younger rationales of preventing erosion of 
the role of juries and avoiding duplicate proceedings, taken to their logical conclusions, would 
extend to civil as well as criminal cases). 
136. Though federal habeas corpus is not limited to criminal defendants, the statute limits 
habeas review to those in "custody" in violation of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c) (1982). 
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that federal review is available, despite the abstention doctrines, where 
necessary to vindicate federal rights. The significance of habeas review 
is that even if abstention initially is required under Younger in certain 
cases, notably state criminal cases, habeas review might afford an ade-
quate federal forum subsequent to adjudication in the state court. 137 
Thus, we now have a simple four-square matrix: 
cases within 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
cases not within 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
FIGURE 2 
Younger abstention 
appropriate 
(state proceeding) 
1 
3 
Younger abstention 
inappropriate 
(no state proceeding) 
2 
4 
Analyzing the Court's decisions within the framework of this ma-
trix, one sees that the revisionist theory yields results consistent with 
the traditional approach, but provides a more satisfactory explanation 
for the abstention doctrines. Each of the four matrix squares are ana-
lyzed below. Squares one, two, and three cover the various Younger 
cases. Square four involves cases not covered by the Younger doctrine. 
It is within this last square that all the remaining abstention doctrines 
come into play, fine-tuning the results obtained by application of 
Younger. 
A. Square One: Actions Within the State's Criminal Jurisdiction 
Where the State Initiates Criminal Proceedings 
Many federal constitutional issues arise in the course of a state 
criminal proceeding. Some are substantive challenges to the applica-
ble state criminal law - for example, a claim that the Constitution 
prohibits criminalizing certain conduct.138 More commonly, the 
Under this definition, most, but not all, criminal defendants could obtain federal habeas corpus 
review, and few, if any, civil litigants could do so. See also infra notes 145-48. 
137. See infra notes 145-48 (discussing relationship between habeas and abstention). 
138. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (challenging a California criminal ob-
scenity statute on the grounds the statute violated the petitioner's first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (challenging a Georgia criminal trespass 
law on the grounds that the statute violated the petitioner's first amendment rights); Younger v. 
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claims are procedural-le., a claim that the state has in the course of 
the criminal proceeding violated a defendant's constitutional due pro-
cess rights. 139 Square one involves attempts by state criminal defend-
ants to obtain federal review of such federal constitutional claims. 
State criminal defendants may file a federal action seeking review 
of these constitutional issues at any of several possible points. The 
federal action could, of course, be filed after the state criminal pro-
ceeding is initiated, seeking a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. 
For example, the defendant could seek to have the state proceeding 
stayed on the ground that the grand jury that indicted him was com-
posed in a racially discriminatory fashion. 140 Or, the federal action 
could be filed after the defendant engages in conduct prohibited by 
state criminal law, but before the state has initiated any proceedings, 
in an effort to prevent the state from filing criminal charges. For ex-
ample, a federal plaintiff who has been threatened with prosecution for 
engaging in allegedly subversive advocacy could file an action in fed-
eral court seeking to enjoin such stat~ proceedings on the ground that 
the allegedly criminal conduct is protected by the first amendment. 141 
Under the revisionist theory, these claims are appropriate for re-
view in a federal trial court. The claims raise serious constitutional 
issues entitled to careful scrutiny, and resolution of the claims gener-
ally will involve fact-finding for which a federal trial court is neces-
sary. Moreover, the volume of cases raising these issues is too high for 
any pretense of adequate review by the Supreme Court.142 Thus, the 
first forum decision mitigates clearly in favor of federal review. 
Under the traditional approach, however, the Supreme Court has 
held that abstention is appropriate in these cases.143 Indeed, these 
cases are at the very core of the Younger doctrine: they request a fed-
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (challenging the California Criminal Syndicalism Act on the grounds 
that the statute violated the petitioners' first and fourteenth amendment rights). 
139. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (challenge to statute authorizing warrant-
less administrative searches); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (challenge to warrantless 
search of a mine). 
140. In Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904), the defendant moved to quash a murder 
indictment on the ground that blacks ha:d been excluded on the basis ofrace from the grand jury. 
A further option for a criminal defendant might be removal of the entire action to the federal 
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982). 
141. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (first and fourteenth amendment challenges 
to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (first 
and fourteerith amendment challenges to Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Communist Con-
trol Law). 
142. See Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 274 (1988) (discussing 
inability of Supreme Court to handle by direct review all constitutional challenges to state crimi-
nal convictions). 
143. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. 
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eral court to stay a state criminal proceeding. Thus, there appears to 
be some conflict between the result demanded by the revisionist theory 
and the result that obtains under the traditional approach. Moreover, 
in this instance there appears to be some conflict between different 
considerations of the revisionist theory, for although these cases seem 
to require a federal trial forum, there are important state interests that 
may justify initial litigation in state court. First, criminal law gener-
ally is regarded as the quintessential state function, and federal courts 
rightly are reluctant to interrupt state criminal proceedings. Second, 
given the nature of the constitutional claims - most are procedural, 
arising in an ad hoc fashion throughout the course of state criminal 
proceedings - permitting federal review of each such claim as it arose 
would pose an intolerable disruption of state criminal proceedings. 144 
Any apparent conflict between the revisionist and traditional mod-
els is resolved in square one, however, by the availability of federal 
habeas corpus review. The general rule is that in these square-one 
cases a convicted prisoner may bring his federal claim to federal court 
subsequent to the exhaustion of his state remedies. The federal court 
is not bound by res judicata with regard to the state court's legal deter-
mination of the constitutional claim, 145 and there even is a mechanism 
for relitigation of facts if the facts were not determined accurately in 
state court. 146 
In this way, habeas works an accommodation between the federal 
and state interests arising in the square-one criminal cases. Litigation 
proceeds initially in state court, but a federal forum generally is avail-
able for relitigation of constitutional claims if the need arises. 147 
144. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 518: 
Sometimes a federal question does not become apparent until the defense has coalesced and 
even then it may be difficult to determine whether the "federal" matter will determine the 
outcome . • . . To require original federal jurisdiction here would be extremely wasteful. 
The state courts here perform a useful sifting function by narrowing the class of cases that 
require federal review to those that in fact tum upon federal issues. 
See also Yackle, supra nQte 2, at 1032-33 ("The federal claims available to criminal defendants 
are typically procedural, their effect on outcome characteristically obscure . • • • The merit of 
claims of that kind, and certainly their effect on the proceedings, can be ascertained only later, 
after the state courts have responded to litigants' federal objections."). 
145. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) ("[T]he state adjudication carries the 
weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction 
on federal constitutional issues. It is not resjudicata."); see generally Friedman, supra note 142, 
at 303-09 (discussing role of res judicata in modem habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (governing the standard of review of state fact-finding 
for federal courts entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus). 
147. Cf Althouse, supra note 2, at 1088. The one significant exception to this principle 
involves fourth amendment claims. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), the Supreme Court 
held that habeas review was unavailable with regard to a claim that the state court failed to 
exclude unlawfully seized evidence, so long as the state court provided a full and fair hearing of 
the fourth amendment claim. I have argued elsewhere that Stone v. Powell was decided incor-
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Therefore, despite the fact that Younger requires abstention in these 
cases, the revisionist theory is consistent with the traditional approach 
in affording the possibility of ultimate federal review for square-one 
cases.148 
B. Square Two: Actions Within the State's Criminal Jurisdiction 
Where the State Cannot or Does Not Initiate Criminal 
Proceedings 
Except for one difference, square-two cases are the same as cases 
arising under square one. The difference is that in square-two cases 
the state either cannot institute criminal proceedings or chooses not to 
do so. If the state has initiated criminal proceedings, or does so 
shortly after the federal action is filed, Younger requires the federal 
court to abstain. 149 In the absence of pending state proceedings, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has made it clear that abstention is not 
warranted.150 
In order to test the revisionist theory against the result obtaining 
under the traditional approach, it is useful to get a sense of how and 
why square-two cases arise. There are basically two possibilities. 
First, the state simply may determine not to file criminal charges even 
rectly, and is inconsistent with the entire theory of habeas review. See Friedman, supra note 142, 
at 287. The decision in Stone v. Powell has had a ripple effect in the abstention area. The 
Supreme Court has held that generally (with the notable exception of habeas) the decision of a 
state court on a constitutional claim is resjudicata in a subsequent federal proceeding. See supra 
notes 22-23 and accompanying text. In civil proceedings, this often creates little difficulty for the 
federal plaintiff, who is free to choose whether to proceed initially in federal or state court. Thus, 
the res judicata impact of a state decision can be avoided by proceeding initially in federal court. 
This generally provides no difficulty for a state criminal defendant either because the decision on 
constitutional issues in criminal cases does not have res judicata effect in the subsequent habeas 
case. In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a state court deci-
sion in a criminal proceeding on a fourth amendment issue would have a preclusive effect in a 
subsequent civil rights action by the state criminal defendant. Thus, although these fourth 
amendment claims would be entitled to federal review under the revisionist theory, habeas is 
unavailable to provide such federal review, and the decision of the state criminal court on the 
fourth amendment issue cannot be challenged in a subsequent federal civil proceeding. The revi-
sionist theory of abstention thus serves to emphasize further that the holding in Stone v. Powell is 
incorrect and inconsistent with the fabric of the law of federal jurisdiction. 
148. It is true that there are exceptions to the availability of habeas corpus that jeopardize 
the neatness of this solution. For example, in Stone, 428 U.S. 465, the Court held that fourth 
amendment claims generally are not reviewable on habeas. Moreover, in a series of decisions the 
Court has manipulated the definition of "custody" - the threshold for habeas review - in a 
manner that yields results inconsistent with this solution. See generally Yackle, supra note 2, at 
998-1010 (discussing "custoC:y" cases). There also are habeas decisions on procedural default, 
successive petitions, abuse of the writ, exhaustion, and fact-finding that pose some difficulty. See 
generally Friedman, supra note 142. Rather than viewing these decisions as inconsistent with, 
and thus undermining, the revisionist theory, one may view the revisionist theory as a useful tool 
for critiquing the habeas doctrine. I have done this elsewhere. Id. 
149. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). 
150. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1974). 
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though a criminal statute has been violated. If this is true, the state 
itself shows so little interest in state court litigation that abstention is 
unwarranted. Second, and more common, the federal plaintiff may file 
an "anticipatory action"151 in federal court seeking a declaration that 
the conduct in which the federal plaintiff wishes to engage, but has not 
yet engaged, is constitutionally protected, despite the fact that it is 
proscribed by the state's criminal law. 152 
Under the traditional approach, abstention in these cases is inap-
propriate: the Court relies on the absence of pending state proceedings 
to justify use of a federal trial forum. 153 According to the Court, if the 
federal action cannot go forward, the plaintiff is left either to engage in 
the conduct, thereby violating state law and risking criminal prosecu-
tion, or to refrain from engaging in the arguably protected conduct. 154 
In the Court's view, declaratory relief in the federal courts exists pre-
cisely to avoid this dilemma, and thus abstention under Younger is 
inappropriate. 
The Court's response to this situation under the traditional ap-
proach is not entirely satisfactory. It is true that under either the 
traditional approach or the revisionist theory the absence of a state 
forum in which to raise a federal claim would preclude federal absten-
tion. In this fashion the two models are consistent. It is not com-
pletely accurate, however, to assert that the federal plaintiff in square-
two cases is without a state forum. Although there is no pending 
criminal proceeding in which to raise the federal issue, there is no ob-
vious reason why the federal plaintiff could not file the same declara-
151. See Bator, supra note 2, at 617 n.35 (arguing that there is support for allowing "true 
anticipatory actions" not based on the relative competence of state and federal courts); Field, 
Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 707 (principal way to avoid being forced into state court is 
to file anticipatory action). 
152. See, e.g., Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459. In Steffel, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief under 
the first amendment to protect against his potential arrest under Georgia's criminal trespass law. 
The Court held that a petitioner need not "first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to 
be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights." 
See also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (peremptory first amendment challenge to Louisi· 
ana obscenity statute); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (seeking declaratory judgment 
that Arkansas criminal "anti-evolution" statute was unconstitutional under the first 
amendment). 
153. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462 ("relevant principles of equity, comity and federalism 'have little 
force in the absence of a pending state proceeding' ") (quoting Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMul· 
lan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)). 
154. [W]hile a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete 
opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of the federal courts 
to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the 
Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to 
be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal 
proceeding. 
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. 
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tory judgment action in state court rather than ·federal court. 155 
Assuming that a state declaratory action would lie, the Court's justifi-
cation for failing to apply Younger to square-two cases is unpersuasive. 
The revisionist theory reaches the same result as under the tradi-
tional approach, but the explanation it provides for that result is fuller 
and more satisfactory. Assuming that the state does provide a vehicle 
for obtaining a declaratory judgment, abstention is still inappropriate 
under the revisionist _theory for at least two reasons. First, the claims 
raised in the federal declaratory proceeding are essentially the same as 
would be raised in a state criminal proceeding: the rights at stake are 
substantial and may depend upon factual determinations, 156 and thus, 
Jitigation of the federal claims in a federal forum is necessary. Because 
subsequent habeas relief would be unavailable in these cases, it is sensi-
ble to proceed in the first instance in the federal trial forum. 
Second, by focusing on the state interest it is possible to see an 
internal logic in treating the "anticipatory action" differently from the 
criminal action. In filing the anticipatory action, the plaintiff, rather 
than violating state law and then seeking to raise a federal claim, de-
fers the arguably protected conduct pending a determination of the 
constitutionality of the criminal law. In this fashion the plaintiff 
shows respect for state interests.157 More important, the state interest 
in enforcing its criminal law - an interest inherent in the criminal 
proceeding - is absent in the anticipatory action because no breach 
has yet occurred.158 The revisionist theory explicitly recognizes this, 
as the traditional approach does not, and "rewards" the federal plain-
155. State declaratory judgment actions may be nonexistent or state practice may differ suffi-
ciently from broad federal declaratory judgment practice so as, in effect, to deprive the plaintiff of 
an adequate forum. For example, a state may not permit criminal statutes to be challenged in 
declaratory judgment actions. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 477, cert. denied, appeal 
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that Texas does not permit de-
claratory relief against criminal statutes). In addition, states may have different ripeness thresh-
olds that would bar declaratory relief even though the same action would not be barred in a 
federal court. Absent any showing to this effect in a specific case, however, the Court's response 
is too facile. 
156. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. 
157. See Wells, Disparity, supra note I, at 34 (the doctrine governing anticipatory actions 
makes sense based on institutional costs of interference with state proceedings); cf. Bator, supra 
note 2, at 617 n.35: 
The important point to note is that there are substantial and interesting arguments in favor 
of permitting this sort of "true" anticipatory action which are not at all based on claims of 
superior federal-court competence[,] ... for instance, the argument that anticipatory relief is 
necessary to avoid the chilling effect of an over-broad statute regulating speech .... 
158. It is true that the state law is still evaluated by a federal court, but that is the case any 
time a federal court reviews a state statute. The key point here is that there is not interference 
with state criminal law enforcement. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) ("When 
no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal interven-
tion does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice 
system .... "). 
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tiff for seeking a determination prior to violating state law. 159 
Thus, the traditional decision not to abstain in these anticipatory 
actions is consistent with the revisionist theory. But the revisionist 
theory provides a more satisfying explanation than that provided by 
the traditional approach. Square-two cases are heard by a federal 
court not because the state forum is inadequate (although that would 
be a sufficient reason if it were true) but because they involve claims 
similar to those raised in criminal actions, but under circumstances in 
which habeas will not be available to provide a federal trial forum. 
Additionally, if there is no state criminal action pending, the state's 
interest is lessened. Therefore, the plaintiff's choice of forum in these 
cases .should be respected. 
C. Square Three: Actions Outside the State's Criminal Jurisdiction 
Where the Federal Defendant (State or Private Party) 
Initiates a State Court Proceeding 
Square-three cases are called "civil Younger" cases. In these cases, 
the plaintiff files a federal action alleging some violation of her consti-
tutional or other federal rights. The defendant in federal court, either 
a private party or the state, then urges the federal court to abstain in 
favor of either a state civil action that was already pending at the time 
the federal action was filed or a state civil action that was filed shortly 
after federal proceedings were begun. For example, a federal plaintiff 
may seek a federal determination of the constitutionality of conduct 
that is the subject of a state civil enforcement action. 160 Or, a federal 
plaintiff may come to court for relief from application of a procedural 
159. This description of the decision not to abstain is supported by judicial resolution of the 
ripeness concerns that inevitably arise in the context of such anticipatory suits. When a plaintiff 
files suit seeking a declaration that conduct criminal under a state statute is protected by the 
Constitution it is a fair response that such an action may not be ripe. It is difficult to answer 
accurately the constitutional question without some specific context, i.e., without knowing ex-
actly what conduct is in question. See Field, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 707. In a 
number of cases, however, federal courts have expressly loosened the ripeness standard in order 
to render judgment in these cases. Id. at 709 n.126 ("[c]hallenges to an enactment brought 
before any violation are sometimes justiciable"); see also D. LAYLOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES 1211 (1985) (The Supreme Court routinely "entertain[s] suits to declare statutes un-
constitutional, invoking the ripeness requirement only occasionally."); Ohio Civil Rights 
Commn. v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (filing of administrative com-
plaint against religious school for dismissal of pregnant teacher); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 
U.S. 485 (1952) (permitting a group of teachers, parents, and administrators to challenge a New 
York civil service law providing for dismissal of teachers who advocated violence against the 
government, despite the fact that none of the plaintiffs was even remotely threatened with dismis-
sal; only Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, commented on the apparent jurisdictional concerns). 
160. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (first amendment challenge to an Ohio 
public nuisance statute which provides that a place exhibiting obscene films is a nuisance and 
allows up to a year's closure of any such place); Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 
1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking relief from Georgia obscenity statute); General Corp. v. 
Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking injunctive and 
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rule employed in state civil litigation, perhaps a rule requiring posting 
of bond for costs or permitting gamishment.161 
It may be useful at the outset to specify what cases are not square-
three cases. Often a federal plaintiff will file an action alleging that a 
state official or the state itself has violated the plaintiff's rights; the 
plaintiff seeks damages in federal court.162 Theoretically, the state offi-
cial or the state could file an independent action in state court for a 
declaration that the state's or official's past conduct was not violative 
of the plaintiff's federal rights, and then ask the federal court to ab-
stain in favor of that state proceeding. For the following reason, how-
ever, this scenario does not constitute a square-three case and 
abstention is not warranted. 
Removal jurisdiction distinguishes those civil actions in which the 
federal court will abstain under Younger (square three) from those in 
which it will not (square four). In the scenario just suggested, any 
such action filed by the defendant in state court could be removed to 
federal court by the federal plaintiff. 163 Because the essence of 
Younger abstention is to favor a pending state proceeding, 164 and be-
cause there can be no pending state proceeding here (because any pro-
ceeding so begun would be removed), this scenario is not a square-
three case, but belongs rather in square four where Younger abstention 
does not apply. 
It is also useful for definitional purposes to compare square-three 
cases with square-one cases. In both types of cases, the federal court 
stays its hand in favor of a pending state proceeding. The difference is 
that square-one cases involve state criminal proceedings, while square-
three cases involve state civil proceedings. In civil cases, there is no 
explicit remedy of federal habeas corpus providing federal review sub-
sequent to state proceedings.165 Thus, the only access to a federal fo-
rum in square-three cases ordinarily will be direct review by the 
declaratory relief from Alabama state court orders enjoining the operation of several theaters and 
book stores). 
161. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (challenge to attachment procedure in Illi-
nois civil action seeking a return of welfare payments alleged to have been wrongfully received); 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (federal action to declare unconstitutional a Texas 
statute allowing a judgment creditor to secure and execute a lien on a judgment debtor's 
property). 
162. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (federal action alleging that municipal police 
officers violated plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights while conducting a warrantless search 
and seizure). 
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). 
164. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (Younger abstention required because state 
criminal action was still pending). 
165. See supra notes 136, 145-48. 
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Supreme Court. In these civil cases, therefore, the adequacy of the 
revisionist theory rests either on the ability of a federal plaintiff to 
avoid falling into square three, or on the adequacy of direct review by 
the Supreme Court of the state action. 
In order to test the adequacy of direct review, it is necessary to 
divide square-three cases into two types. First, there are cases in 
which the challenge of the federal plaintiff is procedural: the plaintiff 
alleges that some aspect of the procedures employed in the state pro-
ceeding violates constitutional or other federal proscriptions, typically 
the due process clause. Second, there are substantive challenges: the 
federal plaintiff alleges that the conduct for which he is to be held 
liable in state court is immune from sanction by virtue of a federal law 
or constitutional guarantee. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind 
that in square three the federal defendant may be either the state or a 
private party. 
1. Federal Court Challenge to State Procedures 
Taking the procedural cases first, it makes little difference whether 
the federal defendant is a private party or the state. These are cases 
such as Trainor v. Hernandez 166 or Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 167 in 
which the defendant, dissatisfied with the procedural fairness of some 
aspect of the state proceeding, seeks a declaration in federal court that 
the procedure is invalid and perhaps an injunction against use of the 
procedure .. In both the private and state defendant cases, the Supreme 
Court has made fairly clear that the federal court should abstain and 
not interfere with the pending state proceeding. 
Just as it would under the revisionist theory, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that abstention under the traditional approach is inap-
propriate where the state makes no provision for challenging the pro-
cedural fairness of its own proceeding. In Trainor, for example, the 
federal plaintiffs sought federal review of a state attachment procedure 
that was being used against them in a state action to recover funds 
allegedly fraudulently obtained from the state. 168 The Supreme Court 
held that the federal court should have applied the principles of 
Younger and Huffman, but the Court refused to decide in the first 
instance whether the state proceeding afforded an adequate opportu-
nity to raise the federal constitutional challenge, and remanded. 169 On 
remand, the district court found that no such adequate opportunity 
166. 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
167. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
168. 431 U.S. at 437-38. 
169. 431 U.S. at 447-48. 
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existed in state court, and reinstated its judgment against the defen-
dants.170 This outcome is perfectly consistent wit:\l the revisionist the-
ory, for, absent a means of raising the claim in state court, there 
probably will be no opportunity to raise the claim in the only federal 
forum available, the Supreme Court. m 
Assuming that the state court does provide .an opportunity for re-
view of the procedural challenge on the merits, the propriety of ab-
stention under the revisionist theory rests upon· whether direct review 
by the Supreme Court is adequate to protect the federal. rights in-
volved, or whether there is a need for a federal trial forum. The reason 
abstention under the revisionist theocy generally is appropriate is that 
in the vast majority of these cases the procedural challenge to state 
proceedings can be r~olved without the need for federal trial c~urt 
fact-finding, and typically the challenges are of a broad nature fre-
quently resolved by the Supreme Court on direct review. 
The common characteristic of these procedu~al challenges is that 
almost invariably the challenge is to some state action taken pursuant 
to the state's statutory or regulatory law. For example, in an action to 
recover state benefits, the challenge may be to an attachment or lien· 
procedure.172 In a child custody case involving allegations of parental 
abuse, a parent may claim he was given no opportunity to be heard 
before being deprived of custody.173 It is not coincidental that these 
cases raise challenges to state action taken pursuant to state statutes 
and regulations. After all, if state actors were not involved, there 
would be no federal question supporting jurisdiction in the federal fo-
rum.174 And in civil proceedings, as opposed to criminal proceedings, 
most of the governing procedure is spelled out in statutes or rules. 175 
Given the nature of these cases, direct Supreme ·court review gen-
170. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
171. See Yackle, supra note 2, at 1043 (iffederal courts abstain under Younger in civil ca5es, 
no federal review may be possible except by the Supreme Court); Althouse, supra note 2, at 
1063-65 (discussing application of this principle in Pennzoil and arguing that the Court's test for 
determining when state procedures provide an adequate opportunity is too strict). · 
172. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (attachment), discussed supra at notes 
168-69 and accompanying text. 
173. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (19-79) (federal challenge to Texas statute allowing 
state temporarily to deny custody of children to parents suspected .of abuse). . 
174. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) ("Because the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by conduct that may be fairly char-
acterized as 'state action.' "). 
175. See generally Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 579, 579 
(1984) ("Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has been the dominant force in shaping criminal 
procedure .•.. Yet civil procedure ... has remained relatively untouched .... "); id. at 612 ("In 
the past, reformers changed civil procedure through legislation and rulemaking rather than con-
stitutional adjudication."). 
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erally will be adequate to protect federal interests. First, federal fact-
finding usually will not be essential in a challenge to a state procedural 
statute or rule. Typically, the challenge attacks the statute "on its 
face" as opposed to "as applied." For example, a constitutional chal-
lenge may allege that the due process clause requires notice prior to 
garnishment, and that the statute at issue has no notice provision.176 
Even when facts are relevant to the determination, the facts that must 
be found are not particularly susceptible to biased interpretation. It 
usually is clear from the record whether a litigant or lawyer received 
notice. There may be a dispute over whether a certain form of notice 
was legally sufficient, but, unlike the complicated and highly interpre-
tive determination of, for example, whether a confession was obtained 
without coercion, 171 these facts are to a much greater degree a matter 
of historical record. Because most square-three procedural cases pose 
facial challenges to state statutes, or challenges to the application of 
statutes where state fact-finding is unlikely to be suspect, Supreme 
Court review is adequate in these cases, and abstention therefore is 
inappropriate under the revisionist theory. 
Moreover, in contrast to the wealth of federal procedural issues 
arising in every criminal case, the volume of constitutional procedural 
challenges in civil litigation is relatively slight, enhancing the suffi-
ciency of direct review. This conclusion, as noted earlier, is consistent 
with the fact that most civil procedural challenges are of a broad facial 
nature. Moreover, given the broad statutory nature of the challenges, 
the impact of the decision will go far beyond the facts of each case. 
All these factors support the ability of a worthy federal suitor to ob-
tain adequate protection of federal rights by way of review in the 
Supreme Court should the state courts fail to enforce those rights.178 
176. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (civil action seeking return of alleg· 
edly fraudulently obtained welfare payments); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due process 
challenge to replevin provisions of Florida law authorizing a private party, without a hearing or 
prior notice to the other party, to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin); Lynch v. Household 
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (due process challenge to Connecticut law authorizing summary 
pre-judicial garnishment). 
177. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-56, 491-99 (1966) (inquiring in detail into 
interrogation techniques generally advocated and into the particular techniques used in the cases 
on review); see also Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 84 (1964) ("Secret police interrogation of suspects raises 
[some] very serious problems . . . . [One] is the difficult problem of proof."). 
178. If this observation is valid, it is worth noting that the recent, widely acclaimed elimina· 
tion of the last vestiges of the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction might have been a poor 
decision. Until this year, although most of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was discretionary, 
when the constitutionality of a state statute was challenged, either facially or as applied, review 
by the Supreme Court was guaranteed as of right within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
On its face, the distinction between appeal and certiorari would explain abstention in the 
square-three cases to the extent that Supreme Court appellate review, given its mandatory na· 
ture, would be adequate, particularly when square-three cases are compared to cases receiving 
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Finally, in the rare circumstance in which fact-finding is important 
and the state court simply distorts the facts, the Supreme Court's 
traditional jurisprudence may afford sufficient opportunity for relief to 
satisfy the revisionist theory. First, there is precedent in civil rights 
cases for the Supreme Court on direct review to disregard state fact-
finding and reach its own factual conclusions.179 Of course, given that 
only discretionary review. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that it was hotly de-
bated, first, whether the appellate jurisdiction differed that much from certiorari as a practical 
matter, and, second, whether the nature of the square-three cases and the Court's workload 
permitted adequate review in any event. See, e.g., Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 
COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1291-99 (1979); see also Wells, Abstention, supra note 2, at 1128-29. 
Despite the fact that the matter was hotly contested, a majority of the Court at one time paid 
lip service to the notion that appellate review was more adequate and meaningful than certiorari 
review. Hicks v. Miranda, 442 U.S. 332 (1975), provides a good example. In Hicks, the State of 
California brought an action to have declared obscene a film then being shown in the federal 
plaintiffs' theater. The state also brought misdemeanor charges against theater employees. The 
theater-owner defendants lost in state court and, rather than appealing, filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in federal court. The three-judge federal panel declared the obscenity statute uncon-
stitutional, specifically declining to follow the contrary implication of the Supreme Court's 
summary dismissal in Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974) (Miller II), a case decided within 
the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 341. On appeal, the Supreme Court held 
that, under Younger, the lower federal courts should have abstained, and that the federal plain-
tiffs must first pursue their state appellate remedies. 422 U.S. at 349. In that same opinion, the 
Court held that the three-judge district court was incorrect on the merits. Justice White, speak-
ing for the Court, stated: 
[In Miller II,] a federal constitutional issue was properly presented, it was within our appel-
late jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and we had no discretion to refuse a?judication 
of the case on its merits as would have been true had the case been brought here under our 
certiorari jurisdiction. We were not obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and 
we did not; but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the 
appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the California statute was 
not a substantial one. The three-judge court was not free to disregard this pronouncement. 
422 U.S. at 344. 
The Court was correct, of course, in maintaining that, given that the case arose within the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction, it had no discretion to avoid the merits; it is also true, however, 
that just as the Court was free to deny plenary consideration, the Court was also free to deny 
summary decisions any precedential effect. It chose not to do so, perhaps not coincidentally in a 
square-three case where Younger abstention was held to be appropriate. The Supreme Court's 
holding that these summary resolutions of appeals receive greater precedential effect than certio-
rari denials suggests that the Court believed that appeals receive greater consideration. 
Given the recent elimination of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, the point is now 
moot. The revisionist theory suggests, however, that the remaining appellate jurisdiction was no 
mere vestige, and that perhaps Supreme Court direct review of challenges to state statutes should 
1;e mandatory once again. 
179. If the Supreme Court suspects that state court fact-finding is potentially biased in a 
given case, it may remand or dismiss the case to resolve ambiguity in the trial court's record. 
See, e.g., Simmons v. West Havens Housing Auth., 399 U.S. 510, 511 (1970) (appeal from aµ 
eviction judgment) ("Because of an ambiguity in the record concerning the underlying reason 
these .•• appellants were denied an opportunity to appeal the trial court's judgement ordering 
that they be evicted, we now conclude that the appeal be dismissed."). Moreover, the Court has 
on occasion done its own fact-finding in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 
380, 385-86 (1927): 
[T)his Court will review the findiQg of facts by a State court where a federal right has been 
denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it; or 
where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to 
make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts. 
See also M. SHAPIRO, COUR'IS: A COMPARATIVE AND PoLmCAL ANALYSIS 41 (1981) ("[T]he 
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it is diffic~lt for an appellate court to determine factual issues, appel-
late fact-finding is not a desirable or reliable safeguard. 180 More im-
portant, although there is no formal vehicle for subsequent federal 
review of civil cases analogous to habeas corpus, when a case proceeds 
through state court and then on to direct federal review, and a need 
for feder!J.]. fact-finding later develops, access to an initial federal forum 
might - and perhaps should - be available. Indeed, in Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 181 the first civil case to apply Younger, then-Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated explicitly that the question of 
where an action should proceed initially is different from whether ac-
cess to a federal trial forum might be obtained at a later date. 182 All 
that Huffman decided was that state appellate remedies must be ex-
hausted before federal remedies are sought. 
Alt4ough the Court avoided decision on a procedure analogous to 
habeas in the civil context, subsequent federal review of state civil 
cases need not be barred by res judicata any more than it is in criminal 
cases. Res judicata traditionally will not apply if the prior adjudica-
tion did not present a "full and fair opportunity" for adjudication on 
the merits.183 In habeas, this principle is embodied in the idea that res 
judicata does not apply to legal judgments, although deference to state 
fact determinations nonetheless is statutorily mandated unless the 
habeas petitioner can show some fault with state fact-finding. •84 If 
state fact-finding is biased in a civil court, then, under traditional prin-
Supreme Court has long held that it will make its own findings of 'constitutional fact.' But 
constitutional facts are often the same routine facts that the trial court has already decided.''). 
See generally HART & WESCHLER, supra note 1, at 661 ("Article III explicitly legitimates this 
power by specifying that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 'both as to Law and 
Fact'"). 
180. See supra note 102. 
181. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
182. Even assuming, arguendo, that litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolu-
tion of all federal issues, th11t entitlement is most appropriately asserted by a state litigant 
when he seeks to relitigate a federal issue adversely determined in completed state court 
proceedings. We do not understand why the federal forum must be available prior to com· 
pletion of the state proceedings in which the federal issue arises, and the considerations 
canvassed in Younger militate against such a result. 
420 U.S. at 606. . 
183. See Kremer v. Chemical Consti'. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982): 
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined the content of the re-
quirement that the first adjudication offer a full and fair opportunity to litigate. But for 
present purposes, where we are bound by the statutory directive of [28 U.S.C.] § 1738, state 
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit 
guaranteed by federal law. 
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (setting forth a general presumption in favor of state 
courts' factual findings); see also Su~ner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (noting that federal· 
ism in~erests embodied in § 2254(d) require that federal courts generally defer to state court fact· 
finding); Friedman, suprd note 142, at 311 ("[A)lthough state court determinations on questions 
of law .are not res judicata, federal habeas courts accord state court determinations of fact a 
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ciples, res judicata ought not bar subsequent federal relitigation. This 
conclusion explains the Court's reservation in Huffman of whether an 
initial federal forum might be available in the civil Younger cases if a 
civil petitioner were prepared to make a showing similar to that in the 
habeas statute.185 This conclusion would also explain the Court's in-
sistence upon deference to state proceedings that have afforded an op-
portunity to raise a federal claim.186 Of course, a situation requiring 
subsequent federal review would arise only rarely. But, under both the 
traditional and revisionist theories, in the rare case where a federal 
plaintiff can show no full and fair opportunity to obtain adjudication 
in state court, federal review in a trial court would be appropriate. 187 
Thus, in the context of procedural challenges to state actions, the 
revisionist theory is consistent with the traditional approach. Hearing 
such procedural challenges in federal court on an ad hoc basis would 
undoubtedly disrupt state court proceedings. Such disruption would 
be the price of federalism if there were no alternative means for raising 
these challenges and obtaining federal review. However, because these 
cases largely are not dependent on federal fact determinations, but 
pose broad questions with far-reaching consequences, adequate review 
- if Supreme Court review ever is - is most likely in cases such as 
these. 188 
2. Federal Court Challenges to the Substantive Propriety 
of a State Proceeding 
Unlike procedural challenges, challenges to the substantive propri-
ety of a state proceeding run a somewhat greater likelihood of requir-
ing federal fact-finding. To the extent that federal fact-finding is not 
required - as, for example, in the large volume of cases posing facial 
or overbreadth challenges to state statutes - everything said above 
regarding procedural challenges would apply to substantive chal-
lenges. But, to the extent that federal fact-finding is required, these 
substantive challenges require further analysis. 189 
presumption of correctness - indeed, the federal habeas statute requires that federal courts" give 
some respect to state court factual determinations.").' · 
185. See 420 U.S. at 605-07. 
186. E.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 
(1977); see also supra note 109. 
187. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (holding that state administrative 
agency was "incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it," and there-
fore, that Younger dismissal was inappropriate); see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 n.4 
(1975) (noting that the facts of Gibson presented "extraordinary circumstances"). 
188. For a discussion of the adequacy of Supreme Court review generally,' see infra notes 
310-18 and accompanying text. 
189. Just as in the area of procedural challenges, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
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The key point regarding substantive challenges is that to the extent 
there is a denial of adequate federal review, the fault rests not with the 
abstention doctrines, but with the Supreme Court's decisions in Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley 190 and Tennessee v. Union & Planters' 
Bank 191 In Mottley, the Court held that federal question jurisdiction 
must be based on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, and not on any 
defense the defendant might assert. 192 In Planters' Bank, the Court 
held that this "well-pleaded complaint" rule applied to removal 
cases:193 a state defenda~t cannot remove a case to federal court on 
federal question grounds simply because he intends to rely on a federal 
defense. 
To the extent that abstention bars federal review of substantive fed-
eral defenses, therefore, the Mottley and Planters' Bank rules are re-
sponsible.194 If the Court did not require abstention in cases in which 
the state defendant filed a new action in federal court seeking declara-
tory or injunctive relief on the basis of the federal defense, Mottley and 
Planters' Bank would be completely circumvented. It would be curi-
ous indeed if, after barring removal, the Supreme Court simply al-
lowed the state defendant with a federal defense to file a new federal 
action and then stay state proceedings. If the resulting denial of a 
federal trial forum is unacceptable, however, fault should be found 
elsewhere than with the abstention doctrines. 
The revisionist theory does, however, indicate how - even in light 
of Mottley and Planters' Bank - parties with federal defenses may 
obtain review of their claims by federal trial courts. Just as the state 
criminal defendant in square-one cases has the option with regard to 
substantive defenses of avoiding state criminal proceedings either by 
abstaining from the conduct at issue or by filing an anticipatory federal 
abstention is inappropriate in cases in which the state proceeding provides no opportunity to 
raise the substantive federal defense. In Ohio Civil Rights Commn. v. Dayton Christian Schools, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), for example, the State of Ohio brought an administrative action against 
a parochial school that fired a teacher due to the teacher's pregnancy and her consultation with 
an attorney about possible legal action against the school. The defendant came to federal court 
seeking an injunction on the ground that the first amendment's free exercise clause rendered it 
immune from such state administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court held that federal ab· 
stention was appropriate in the case, but rested its conclusion on the school's ability to raise the 
claim in state court, even though that opportunity did not exist in the administrative proceeding 
but only in state court review of that proceeding. 477 U.S. at 629. This reliance on opportunity 
to raise the claim in state court is consistent, again, with the revisionist theory. 
190. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
191. 152 U.S. 454 (1894). 
192. 211 U.S. at 152. 
193. 152 U.S. at 462. 
194. For an excellent discussion concerning the denial of federal review occasioned by Mot· 
tley and Planter's Bank, see generally Collins, supra note 102, at 717. 
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declaratory action, the potential defendant to a state civil enforcement 
action has the same opportunity. For example, the bar owner who 
cares to employ topless dancers (alleging a first amendment right to do 
so) and who is threatened with a civil nuisance action in state court as 
a result, may file a declaratory suit in federal court before engaging in 
the conduct, and thus obtain a federal determination of the substantive 
defense. 195 For all the reasons explained in the analysis of such "antic-
ipatory actions" in square two, this option is perfectly consistent with 
the revisionist theory.196 
In sum, most square-three cases will receive adequate review of 
federal claims. In some cases, this will occur by filing an anticipatory 
action and avoiding square three and abstention altogether. In other 
· cases, review will occur in the Supreme Court following state proceed-
ings. Moreover, to the extent federal review is unavailable, abstention 
is not the villain; removal and federal question rules pose the real 
problem. Thus, generally, square-three cases are consistent with the 
revisionist theory. 
D. Square Four: Civil Actions Initiated in Federql Court Where the 
Federal Defendant Cannot or Has Not Initiated State 
Court Proceedings 
The fourth square is in many ways the most complex, and most 
interesting, to analyze. It too is consistent with the revisionist theory. 
Into this square fall all civil actions instituted by a federal plaintiff in 
which Younger abstention is inappropriate because no state proceeding 
has been or can be initiated to which a federal court will defer. 
There are several types of cases in square four: There are actions 
195. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (three bar owners brought an action 
seeking a determination of the constitutionality of a New York statute proscribing topless danc-
ing; only one of the three had been prosecuted). 
196. Although subject to some uncertainty, the same sort of "anticipatory action" ought to 
be available to the state court defendant in a private civil action. If, for example, Corporation A 
sues Corporation B for breach of contract, Corporation,B may wish to defend on the ground that 
contract performance now would violate the new federal antitrust laws. If Corporation B 
breaches and Corporation A sues, Mottley says this is not a federal question case, and Planters' 
Bank says that if the suit is filed in state court Corporation B cannot remove. But Corporation B 
ought to be able, prior to breach, to sue in federal court for a declaration that it can fulfill its 
contract obligation consistent with federal law. Yet, the declaratory judgment cases arguably 
disallow this cause of action. If such an "anticipatory action" is prohibited, however, it is not 
because of abstention rules, but because of removal and declaratory judgment rules. See 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 10 (1983) (suggesting 
that the no-removal rule is not a mere judicial creation but results from the statutory scheme). 
Cases such as Franchise Tax Board seem inconsistent with cases permitting declaratory actions 
when the state is a defendant in federal court. But see Romero v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959) ("[T]he many limitations which have been placed on 
jurisdiction under [federal law] are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to 
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts."). 
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under section 1983 challenging the conduct of state officials. 197 There 
are actions challenging the constitutionality of a state statute apart 
from state enforcement proceedings. 198 There are actions involving 
federal rights that are parallel to state proceedings, such as the Colo-
rado River cases.199 And, finally, there are actions challenging the re-
sults of state administrative proceedings.200 
The common characteristic of these actions is that the federal de-
fendant cannot initiate a state court proceeding. There are essentially 
two reasons for this inability. First, the state defendant might be able 
to remove any state action so filed in ,federal court under the removal 
statutes, and thus no state proceeding would exist to which Younger 
would require deference. 201 Second, a federal plaintiff might bring an 
anticipatory action before engaging in conduct over which the federal 
defendant could bring suit in state court.202 These two reasons over-
lap, but they are not coterminous. 
A quick summary of the three forum decisions suggests some diffi-
culty with applying the revisionist theory to these square-four cases. 
First, in some of these cases the federal right is insubstantial, or re-
quires little federal fact-finding, and yet may implicate serious state 
interests. Second, if federal issues do arise, in most cases the state 
permits these issues to be raised in state court. Finally, to the extent 
that state review is available, and the issue is, for instance, a facial 
challenge to a state statute, Supreme Court review would be just as 
adequate as it would be for square-three cases. Thus, there are square-
four cases in which the traditional approach, which relegates these 
cases to the federal courts under Younger, seems inconsistent with the 
allocation dictated by the revisionist theory. 
It turns out upon close examination, however, that all of the re-
maining abstention doctrines - to the extent they can be pigeonholed 
- serve to limit federal review in square-four situations in which the 
federal plaintiff has filed a federal action in a matter not within the 
state's criminal jurisdiction, and under Younger the federal defendant 
197. See e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 13 
Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago for a warrantless search of plaintiff's home). 
198. For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the plaintiff sued to 
challenge a state statute that permitted the sheriff, without notice or hearing, to post her name in 
liquor stores as an alcoholic who could not buy liquor. 
199. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); see also 
infra notes 255-91 and accompanying text. 
200. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Commn. v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). These cases are discussed further infra at notes 233·54 
and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. 
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cannot initiate a state proceeding to which the federal court will defer. 
In effect, therefore, the other abstention doctrines simply fine-tune 
Younger, making it consistent with the revisionist theory. Square four 
is by definition too broad to provide a careful allocation of cases to the 
federal and state courts. Beginning with the premise that all square-
four cases begin in federal court, however, the other abstention cases 
serve to reallocate a portion of the cases to state court. 
In fact, this interpretation of the non-Younger abstention cases is 
of great assistance in clarifying the law with regard to the remaining 
abstention doctrines. As the Court itself has conceded, the abstention 
decisions are difficult to pigeonhole;203 over time the rationales for ab-
staining have varied, and the specific contours of any one doctrine 
have been most unclear. The Court has been able to achieve little 
agreement as to the bases for abstention and when particular doctrines 
apply. 
Application of the revisionist theory to those doctrines helps sort 
out the case law. The non-Younger doctrines turn out to be nothing 
more than intuitive groupings of cases where federal trial-level review 
potentially is unnecessary. More significant than the description of an 
abstention doctrine under the traditional approach is an examination 
of similarities and differences in cases where the doctrine did or did 
not apply. Examining these similarities and differences indicates that 
the cases divide clearly along the criteria relevant under the revisionist 
theory. The revisionist theory, therefore, provides a sounder under-
standing of abstention than does the traditional approach. 
1. Pullman Abstention 
The paradigmatic situation involving allocation of square-four 
cases under the revisionist theory is found in a group of abstention 
cases falling generally under the head of "Pullman abstention." In 
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 204 Pullman porters, who tradi-
tionally were black, intervened in a federal action brought by the Pull-
man Company and other railroads challenging a Texas Railroad 
Commission order requiring that all Pullman sleepers be under the 
supervision of Pullman conductors, who traditionally were white.205 
The Supreme Court held thaf abstention was appropriate to permit the 
203. See supra note 113. 
204. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
205. The Pullman Company and the railroads attacked the commission order as unauthor-
ized by Texas law as well as violative of the equal protection, due process, and commerce clauses 
of the U.S. Constitution. The portel'li' main objection was that the order discriminated against 
blacks in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 312 U.S. at 498. 
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state court to address the threshold question of whether the challenged 
order was within the Commission's authority in the first place.206 This 
form of abstention does not deprive the federal plaintiff of review over 
the federal claim: if the federal claim is not rendered moot by state-
court determination of the state law issue, the plaintiff may return to 
federal court to press her claim. 201 
Under the traditional approach, the justification for Pullman ab-
stention is that the federal court should allow the state court to resolve 
the state law question in order to avoid the federal court answering the 
state law question differently than would a state court.208 Because the 
state courts have the last word in interpreting state law, state policy 
could be hampered in the period between an erroneous interpretation 
of state law by a federal court and a subsequent "correct" interpreta-
tion by the state court. 209 
This rationale explains Pullman and comports with the revisionist 
206. The Pullman Court recognized that state law might render the federal constitutional 
questions moot: "If there was no warrant in state law for the Commission's assumption of au-
thority there is an end of the litigation; the constitutional issue does not arise. The law of Texas 
appears to furnish easy and ample means for determining the Commission's authority.'' 312 U.S. 
at 501. 
207. In Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 
(1957), the Supreme Court held that if a party chooses not to submit federal questions (in this 
instance, the constitutionality of a state statute) for state court determination, the state court 
must at least be informed of the nature of the challenge: 
The bare adjudication by the Alabama Supreme Court •.. does not suffice, since that court 
was not asked to interpret the statute in light of the constitutional objections presented to 
the District Court. If appellant's freedom-of-expression and equal protection arguments 
had been presented to the state court, it might have construed the statute in a different 
manner. 
353 U.S. at 366. 
When a state court decides such a federal question presented to it, and the litigant decides not 
to seek Supreme Court review (or it is denied), however, the litigant is bound by the state deter-
mination only if he truly elected "to seek a complete and final adjudication of [his] rights in [a] 
state court[] .... " England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 
(1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963)). The litigant "may inform the 
state courts that he is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose of complying with 
Windsor and that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the question of state 
law, to return to the District Court for disposition of his federal contentions." England, 375 U.S. 
at 421. See generally Field, Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1078-79. 
208. The Court explained in Pullman that federal courts are not as capable as state courts of 
making determinations of state law: 
But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape 
being a forecast rather than a determination ..•. [T]he last word on the statutory authority 
of the Railroad Commission in this case[] belongs neither to us nor to the district court but 
to the Supreme Court of Texas. In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide 
an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudi-
cation. . • . The reign of Jaw is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is 
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. 
312 U.S. at 449-500. 
209. See 312 U.S. at 499-501. But cf Field, Abstention Today, supra note 2, at 604: 
[A]n abstention may be rendered utterly purposeless in any given case by the state supreme 
court declining to review the lower court's ruling. A lower state court's guess as to how the 
state supreme court would decide the disputed state law issue may not be any more in-
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theory. What the Court appears to acknowledge in the Pullman cases 
is that state and federal courts may answer the same legal questions in 
different ways. Thus, uncertain state law questions of broad policy 
importance to the state are sent to state court for resolution; federal 
questions, however, are reserved for federal resolution. 
To be sure, Pullman has been criticized because state law is often 
not particularly uncertain, and because the state law question is often 
of limited applicability or import; in either case, the only thing 
achieved by abstention is delay in resolving a federal question and vin-
dicating federal rights. 210 But there is another explanation for Pull-
man abstention that comports quite well with the revisionist theory. 
In addition to the state law justification for Pullman, theAshwander211 
principle - that a federal court should not prematurely or unnecessa-
rily address a novel constitutional or federal question212 - justifies the 
exercise of abstention in Pullman cases.213 For example, in 1941 the 
Court could not have been keen to resolve the equal protection chal-
lenge raised by the Pullman porters. Pullman abstention reflects the 
Court's hope that it would not have to do so, either because resolution 
formed than the federal court's would be. And the whole purpose of abstention is to obtain 
the state supreme court's pronouncement. 
210. See Field, Abstention Today, supra note 2, at 600 ("[B]ecause the availability of absten-
tion depends primarily upon the degree of unclarity of state legal issues, and because some ambi-
guity can be detected in almost any legal rule, the instances in which abstention should be 
ordered do not lend themselves to any definite codification."). Professor Field also questions 
whether, in some circumstances, delay is not merely a byproduct of abstention, but actually its 
aim. Id. at 602. 
211. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
212. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander, stated: 
The Court will not pass upon a eonstitutional question although properly presented by the 
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of. • . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitu-
tional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will 
decide only the latter. 
297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
213. The traditional approach, locked into the language of comity and federalism, tends to 
focus on the first justification for Pullman abstention, while in fact the latter justification is prob-
ably the more typical one. This is seen by comparing two Pullman cases: Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 
U.S. 82 (1970), in which the Court held Pullman abstention appropriate, and Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970), in which the Court held such abstention inappropriate. The 
grounds stated for the decision in each case were the extent to which relevant state law was 
unclear: the Court held state law unclear in Reetz, but clear in Constantineau. In both cases, 
however, the state statute was clear, and the state law issue was the extent to which the clear state 
statute would be invalidated by a previously unconstrued state constitutional provision. Thus, 
both cases involved equally unclear state law questions. 
On state law grounds, therefore, it is difficult to reconcile Reetz and Constantineau. On fed-
eral grounds, however, the cases are as different as night and day. Reetz presented an issue of 
great difficulty under the federal equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses. Con-
stantineau presented a tremendously easy issue under the federal due process clause. See Field, 
Pullman Abstention, supra note 2, at 1100 ("The Court apparently considered the ... issue in 
Constantineau a clear and nonsensitive one."). 
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of the state law question would obviate the need to reach the federal 
question or because the state court would resolve the porters' claim in 
a favorable manner. This justification for Pullman abstention also 
comports with the revisionist theory to the extent that the federal 
question is preserved while state law questions are answered by the 
state court. 
In sum, Pullman abstention provides an important tool for recon-
ciling competing federal and state interests in cases that fall into fed-
eral court under Younger, but which present either state law questions 
that state courts should decide or federal questions federal courts 
would just as soon avoid. The case is sent to state court for resolution 
of the state issue and is returned to federal court if a federal question 
remains. The results under both models appear to be the same, but the 
revisionist theory gives a more candid explanation for those results, 
serving as a better tool for deciding future cases.214 
2. Thibodaux Abstention 
The revisionist theory also explains quite well the resolution of 
cases often grouped together under the head of "Thibodaux absten-
tion." These are actions brought in the diversity jurisdiction of the 
federal court which claim that a state action deprives the federal plain-
tiff of a property interest. Thibodaux 215 and its companion case, 
Frank Mashuda, 216 for example, involved challenges to state condem-
nation proceedings. An earlier "Thibodaux" case, Meredith v. City of 
Winter Haven, 217 involved a challenge to a municipal decision to deny 
certain rights to bondholders on recall of their bonds for refunding. 
214. Two further observations are in order concerning Pullman. First, as Pullman leaves 
decisions of important state questions to state courts, while permitting review of federal questions 
in federal court, Pullman mirrors the manner of direct review in the Supreme Court. See Mur-
dock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626, 632 (1874) ("The State Courts are the 
appropriate tribunals, as this Court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising 
under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise." However, rights "guaranteed to him by 
the Constitution and laws of the Union should not be left to the exclusive and final control of the 
State courts."). In affording an initial federal forum when fact-finding may be important, how-
ever, Pullman abstention fits within the revisionist theory nicely. 
Second, Pullman emphasizes the relationship between square-one and square-three cases, on 
the one hand, and square-two and square-four cases on the other. Pullman was an anticipatory 
action; had the Pullman Company violated the Commission's order, it would have been subject 
to a civil enforcement action in state court. In that action, the federal claim could have been 
raised, subject to direct review by the Supreme Court. Thus, by refraining from violating the 
state rule, the Pullman Company achieved for itself the ability to seek initial review in a federal 
court of its federal claim. 
215. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
216. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). 
217. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Thibodaux abstention is sometimes referred to alternatively as 
Winter Haven abstention. 
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Abstention was held appropriate in Thibodaux, but inappropriate 
in the other two cases. In Thibodaux, the city filed a condemnation 
case in state court. The defendant removed to federal court on 
grounds of diversity. After some preliminary proceedings, the district 
court stayed its hand so the litigants could take back to state court the 
state law question of whether the state statute at issue permitted a 
municipality to issue expropriation orders.218 
The Supreme Court upheld the decision to abstain in Thibodaux 
on the ground that it was necessary for "harmonious federal-state rela-
tions in a matter close to the political interests of a State."219 The 
Court relied upon the ground that eminent domain questions are par-
ticularly important to the states, and that state courts have a special 
competence in the state law question at issue. 220 Thus, according to 
the Court, federalism concerns justified the district court's stay. 
The dissent in Thibodaux objected strenuously on the ground that 
abstention unduly deprived the federal litigant of a forum choice that 
was granted expressly by Congress when it elected to permit removal 
in diversity cases.221 Not only was the dissent correct, but the major-
ity's explanation is doctrinally unsatisfying because the premise of 
Erie 222 is that the federal courts will strive to reach the same result as 
the state court on issues of state law. It is particularly interesting that 
Thibodaux was authored by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote vigorously 
against abstention in the Bulford cases, 223 precisely because abstention 
in these cases deprived litigants of a federal forum in diversity cases. 224 
The very arguments available to Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in 
Bulford mitigated against his decision to permit abstention in 
Thibodaux. 
Thibodaux becomes particularly difficult to justify under the 
Court's analysis when contrasted with an almost identical case decided 
the same day, in which abstention was not permitted. In County of 
218. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26. 
219. 360 U.S. at 29. 
220. 360 U.S. at 29. 
221. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, wrote: 
[T]he imperative duty of a District Court, imposed by Congress under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 
and 1441, [is] to render prompt justice in cases between citizens of different States. To order 
these suitors out of the federal court and into a state court in the circumstances of this case 
passes beyond disrespect for the diversity jurisdiction to plain disregard of this imperative 
duty. 
360 U.S. at 31-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
222. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938). 
223. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text. 
224. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943). 
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Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 225 the state instituted a condemna-
tion proceeding in state court, and effected a taking of respondent's 
property. Subsequently, the state leased the property to a private 
party, allegedly for private use. Respondent then filed a separate ac-
tion in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction, seeking a declara-
tion that under state law the state was without authority to condemn 
the property.226 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that the 
district courts were under an obligation to exercise jurisdiction 
granted them by Congress. 227 He distinguished a case such as 
Thibodaux, where abstention would be appropriate, on the ground 
that the law at issue in Mashuda was well-settled and required only an 
application of that law to the facts of the case, something the district 
court was competent to do.22s 
The distinction made by Justice Brennan between the cases is not 
of evident importance. First, if eminent domain is an area of special 
importance to the states, it should not matter whether it is a federal 
factual or legal determination that interferes with state goals in a given 
case: either is an interference. Second, because legal principles are 
established each time law is applied to novel facts, the need for state 
court, as opposed to federal court, determination should be the same 
no matter how "well-settled" the state law is. Again, the premise of 
Erie is that federal courts will strive to decide state law cases as would 
state courts, not that federal courts would apply state law only when it 
is "well-settled." 
Within the context of the revisionist theory, however, the differ-
ences between Thibodaux and Mashuda become more significant. The 
decisions in Thibodaux and Mashuda strike the balance required 
under the revisionist theory by respecting both Congress' reasons for 
creating diversity jurisdiction and the wider concern for protecting the 
province of state courts. In Thibodaux, the question on which the dis-
trict court abstained was a pure question of state law. Given the broad 
nature ofthe question, the result was applicable not only to the out-of-
state litigant in that case, but to all entities, foreign and local, subject 
to condemnation. 229 State courts were unlikely to decide the issue in a 
way prejudicial to out-of-state interests, thereby jeopardizing across-
225. 360 U.S. 185 (1959). 
226. 360 U.S. at 188. 
227. 360 U.S. at 187. 
228. 360 U.S. at 196. 
229. The issue in Thibodaux was the general interpretation of a statute, rather than the appli· 
cation of that statute to the plaintiff. 360 U.S. at 26-30. 
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the-board application.230 Thus, there was little concern about the kind 
of bias that diversity jurisdiction was established to avoid. On the 
other hand, given the nature of the state law question - a broad ques-
tion of municipal authority under state law to effect takings of private 
property - it was wise to permit resolution in state court. In fact, this 
is precisely the kind of question that the Pullman Court recognized as 
requiring state determination so as not to frustrate state policy. Fed-
eral courts may well answer state law questions differently than would 
state courts, causing "needless friction" between state and federal 
courts.231 
Mashuda, on the other hand, was a very different case. Although 
no case is "purely factual" in that legal principles turn on application 
of facts, Mashuda came about as close as possible to being such a 
case.232 Thus, there was present the precise possibility for bias feared 
by Congress in creating diversity jurisdiction. In addition, although 
an application of law to facts necessarily would result in the federal 
district court making state "law," the broad contours of applicable law 
already were well-settled. Thus, the "Pullman-type" interference with 
state policy objectives was unlikely to occur.233 
On close examination, in fact, Thibodaux was very much like Pull-
man. In Thibodaux, the district court merely stayed its hand while 
the state law question was resolved, leaving for ultimate resolution in 
federal court the fact-based question concerning the validity of the 
230. See 360 U.S. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[S]ince the controlling state law is clear 
and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in the interest of justice to refrain 
from prompt adjudication."). 
231. See infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
232. The Court noted that "[t]he only question for decision is the purely factual question 
whether the County expropriated the respondents' land for private rather than for public use." 
360 U.S. at 190. 
233. A case superficially contrary to this analysis is Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 
(1943), which is often discussed by commentators in the context of Thibodaux abstention. Win-
ter Haven involved a challenge in federal court to a municipality's interpretation of its authority 
to recall certain bonds without paying a refunding premium. The state argued in favor of absten-
tion on the ground that state law on the question was uncertain, and that the question would 
therefore be better left to resolution in the state courts. The Supreme Court described the issue in 
the case as whether the district court rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground 
that state law was uncertain. 320 U.S. at 229. Relying on the obligation theory, the court held 
abstention inappropriate. 320 U.S. at 237-38. What is important about Winter Haven is that 
although the question was phrased in terms of uncertainty, because that is how the litigants 
framed the issue, state law in fact was not at all uncertain. Indeed, the very question had been 
resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in a prior case involving the very same bonds. 320 U.S. 
at 232-33. The argument that the law was uncertain was based solely on the ground that the 
Florida Supreme Court had failed to address some precedents contra to its decision, and that it 
might therefore change its mind in the future. 320 U.S. at 233-34. If that is the definition of 
uncertainty, no law ever is certain. Contrary to the position of those seeking abstention in Win-
ter Haven, law rarely gets more certain than when there is a recent decision resolving the issue by 
the highest court empowered to do so. 
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taking. 234 In this way, Thibodaux abstention may be nothing more 
than an application of Pullman, but in diversity rather than federal 
question cases. 
Thibodaux abstention, therefore, turns on exactly those factors rel-
evant under the revisionist theory. The revisionist theory, in fact, pro-
vides a better understanding of this type of abstention than does the 
traditional approach. Although the results are the same, the rationale 
under the traditional approach is unclear and difficult to justify. Thus, 
the revisionist theory again provides a better understanding of absten-
tion in this class of non-Younger cases. 
3. Burford Abstention 
The revisionist theory also explains the doctrine popularly referred 
to as Burford abstention, although the revisionist theory suggests that 
abstention may not be appropriate in the Burford cases. The key ex-
amples of this type of abstention are Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 235 and 
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co. 236 
. Both Burford and Southern Railway involved federal challenges to 
the decision of a state administrative agency. Jurisdiction in both 
cases was premised jointly on diversity and the presence of a federal 
question. Burford involved a challenge to a state grant to an in-state 
party of oil drilling rights that arguably adversely affected the oil 
rights of the out-of-state plaintiff. 237 Southern Railway involved a 
challenge to an order denying the plaintiff the right to discontinue a 
branch of its intrastate railway service.238 
In both cases the Court approved abstention, relying once again on 
the state's interest in the proceeding at hand and the interest in avoid-
ing the "federal-state conflict" that would result from federal court 
interference in the proceedings.239 One significant factor to the Court 
in both cases was the fact that the state had limited the review of the 
particular administrative decision to the courts of one judicial district, 
evidently striving for some uniformity of decision.240 Thus, according 
to the Court, "needless friction" would result from federal court 
234. The Court described the case as one in which the district judge made "a conscientious 
exercise ... of his discretionary power merely to stay disposition of a retained case until he could 
get controlling light from the state court." 360 U.S. at 27 n.2. 
235. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
236. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). 
237. 319 U.S. at 316-17. 
238. 341 U.S. at 342. 
239. Burford, 319 U.S. at 327; Southern Ry .. 341 U.S. at 349-50. 
240. Burford, 319 U.S. at 326; Southern Ry., 341 U.S. at 348. 
December 1989] Abstention Theory 585 
interference. 241 
The contrary view expressed in each case was premised primarily 
on the obligation theory. Justice Frankfurter authored the dissent in 
Burford and a concurrence in Southern Railway, arguing in both that 
no matter how distasteful the exercise of diversity jurisdiction might 
be, because Congre.ss had insisted upon it, federal courts could not 
shirk their obligation to hear diversity cases.242 As these cases in-
volved out-of-state plaintiffs, Justice Frankfurtei;- thought that the pre-
cise danger of bias that prompted Congress to grant diversity 
jurisdiction was likely to be present in these cases. The mere fact that 
a federal court might be likely to reach a result different from that 
reached by a state court on the matter would not be enough to compel 
abstention, Justice Frankfurter concluded, because that was, after all, 
precisely Congress' aim in creating federal diversity jurisdiction.243. 
The difficulty in .th~se cases is that the revisionist theory would 
seem, at first blush, not to countenance abstention. The federal 
"right" at stake, at least with regard to the diversity basis for federal 
jurisdiction, was the "right" to be free from state bias against out-of-
state parties. That bias could manifest itself directly ·in fact-finding 
determinations, making a federal trial court essential for protection of 
the federal right. When this bias seems likely, and particularly when 
subsequent federal review similar to habeas corpus generally would be 
unavailable, the revisionist theory would require that a federal trial 
forum be provided. 
The error of abstaining appears particularly acute when these deci-
sions are contrasted with similar cases in which abstention would not 
lie under the traditional Younger formulation. Southern Railway, for 
example, could be seen as an "anticipatory action." Rather than fail-
ing to comply with the Commission's order and subjecting itself to 
state enforcement jurisdiction, the railroad in effect sought anticipa-
tory relief in federal court following the close of administrative pro-
ceedings. Moreover, Southern Railway was a diversity case. Had the 
Commission sued the railroad for money damages, removal to federal 
court should have been permitted.244 Finally, if the railroad had been 
suing the state, alleging denial of a federal right, it would not even be 
necessary to exhaust state administrative remedies, let alone state judi-
241. Burford, 319 U.S. at 327; Southern Ry., 341 U.S. at 350. 
242. Burford, 319 U.S. at 344-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Southern Ry., 341 U.S. at 361-
62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
243. Burford, 319 U.S. at 344-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Southern Ry.; 341 U.S. at 361-
62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). 
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cial remedies. 245 
The best justification for abstaining in the Burford cases may be 
seen by comparing these cases to state criminal proceedings. If a state 
prosecutes an out-of-state citizen under its criminal law, no statutory 
right to removal exists,246 although the Constitution arguably confers 
diversity jurisdiction over such a case.247 The difference in the statu-
tory treatment of civil and criminal cases no doubt turns on the feder-
alism concern of interfering with state enforcement proceedings. 
Given the highly regulated nature of petitioners' industries in these 
Burford cases, it may be accurate to characterize the state interest at 
stake as analogous to a state's interest in enforcement of its criminal 
law. Moreover, "anticipatory actions" as such are in a sense impossi-
ble to bring in this administrative context, for the regulatory authority 
is ongoing. It is impossible to gain federal jurisdiction before the state 
interest attaches, because the state interest attaches as soon as the state 
licenses one of these highly regulated businesses. For example, in 
Southern Railway the railroad was required to come to the Commis-
sion to r_equest abandonment - the status quo was maintaining the 
rail operation. Similarly, in Burford the Commission was not required 
to enjoin drilling; rather, those wishing to drill had to seek permission. 
As in all highly regulated schemes, state enforcement is ongoing and 
regulated entities must petition to change the status quo. Thus, Bur-
ford cases may be viewed as similar to state criminal cases when no 
opportunity for an anticipatory action exists. 
Moreover, there are factors other than a strong state interest that 
justify abstention under the revisionist theory. One factor is the sheer 
volume of litigation in the federal courts that would be generated by 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in administrative cases like Bur-
ford. 248 Finally, if any substantive federal right is at stake in cases like 
Burford, it is an economic due process right of a sort requiring defer-
ence to the state. 249 
Of course, this leaves the federal plaintiff without recourse to a 
245. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (plaintiff in an action under 28 
U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust state administrative remedies before resorting to the federal 
courts). 
246. Only two sections of title 28 permit removal in criminal proceedings: 28 U.S.C. § 1442 
(1982) (removal by federal officers sued for acts done in the course of their duties) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443 (1982) (removal by defendants with certain civil rights claims). 
247. ''The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a State and Citizens of an-
other State." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. 
248. See 319 U.S. at 332 ("[W]e should leave these problems of Texas law to the state court 
where each may be handled as 'one more item in a continuous series of adjustments.'") (quoting 
Railroad Commn. v. Rowan & Nichols Co., 310 U.S. 570, 584 (1941)). 
249. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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federal fact-finder in the face of potential state bias. In the criminal 
context, habeas corpus is available to ensure subsequent federal re-
view. Although these civil administrative enforcement cases are simi-
lar in certain respects to criminal cases, there is no civil habeas analog. 
While the Court's response to this problem was not ideal, neither 
was it insensitive. In Southern Railway, the Court discounted the risk 
of state bias in fact-finding because "it is now settled that a utility has 
no right to relitigate factual questions on the ground that constitu-
tional rights are involved."250 The Court noted in a footnote that this 
case stood in sharp contrast to 
such cases ... where State judicial review prQcedures plus review in this 
Court were thought to be inadequate ..• [because] the federal right of a 
utility to be protected from confiscation of its property depended upon 
"pure matters of fact" to the extent that a de novo hearing of such facts 
in a federal court was essential to the protection of constitutional 
rights.251 
Finally, there may have been another reason for the Court's skepti-
cism regarding the necessity of diversity jurisdiction in these cases. 
Federal plaintiffs in Burford cases generally are corporate entities. 
Both Burford and Southern Railway were decided before 28 U.S.C. 
section 1332(a) was amended to include a corporation's principal place 
of business as a residence for diversity purposes.252 Subsequent to that 
amendment, neither Burford nor Southern Railway would have been 
diversity cases.253 Moreover, even if the forum state was not a princi-
pal place of business for the corporations, current literature is quite 
skeptical about permitting corporations to invoke diversity as a plain-
tiff in a suit in a jurisdiction where the corporation regularly conducts 
business.254 All told, the Court simply may have been prescient in the 
Burford cases. 
The rationale of Burford is not completely consistent with the revi-
250. 341 U.S. at 348. 
251. 341 U.S. at 349 n.11. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence took sharp issue with the 
Court's assertion of this rationale, not disagreeing on the merits so much as claiming it had not 
been established in prior precedent. See 341 U.S. at 356 n.3 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
252. See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4 (1958) (suggesting virtually every suit involving a corporation fell potentially under 
diversity jurisdiction). 
253. Southern Railway involved only the railway's "Alabama intrastate passenger service •.. 
mainly within Alabama." 341 U.S. at 342-43. Therefore, the railway would today be considered 
a citizen of Alabama and diversity jurisdiction would be destroyed. The land tract at issue in 
Burford was squarely within Texas and both parties were operating strictly in the East Texas oil 
fields. 319 U.S. at 318. Thus, the parties in both cases would lack federal diversity jurisdiction 
today. 
254. For an excellent review of the Supreme Court's inconsistency and confusion with the 
problem of the corporation incorporated in more than one state, see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL 
CoURTS 338-40 (3d ed. 1982). 
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sionist theory. After all, even if de novo review is not essential, fact-
based direct review might nonetheless be inadequate. But, given all of 
the aforementioned considerations counselling against federal review, 
Burford must be considered a close case and, in any event, not plainly 
inconsistent with the revisionist theory. 
4. Colorado River Abstention 
Perhaps the most intriguing puzzle for the revisionist theory arises 
in the context of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding so-called 
Colorado River abstention,. In Colorado River Water Conservation Dis-
trict v. United States, 255 the United States brought suit in federal 
court256 to adjudicate the rights of certain Indian tribes to water from 
the Colorado River.257 Shortly thereafter, several of the federal de-
fendants moved to dismiss the federal action in favor of a pending 
state proceeding that had been initiated after the federal suit.258 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,259 who tra-
ditionally has been the most unyielding proponent of the obligation 
theory, held that dismissal in favor of the state court action was appro-
.priate. The Court found that none of the previously recognized 
branches of the abstention doctrine applied to the case.260 Nonethe-
less, "exceptional circumstances" present in this case indicated that 
255. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
256. The government invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982), which pro· 
vides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United 
States ..•. " 
257. In order to manage the allocation of water resources, Colorado enacted its Water Rights 
Determination and Administration Act in 1969. Under this Act, the state is divided into seven 
water divisions, each division having an established proceeding for adjudicating water claims. 
424 U.S. at 804-05. The government, suing some 1000 water users, sought declaration of the 
government's rights to certain waters located in Division 7: 
[T]he Government asserted rights on its own behalf and on behalf of certain Indian tribes, as 
well as rights based on state law . . • • Prior to institution of this suit, the Government had 
pursued adjudication of non-Indian reserved rights and other water claims based on state 
law in Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6 ..•. 
424 U.S. at 805-06. 
258. "Shortly after the federal suit was commenced, one of the defendants .•. filed an appli· 
cation in the state court for Division 7 seeking" to make the government a party to proceedings 
in that Division for the purpose of adjudicating all of the government's claims, both federal and 
state, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. Several defendants then filed a motion in district 
court to dismiss the federal action. The district court granted a motion to dismiss, but the court 
of appeals reversed, "holding that the suit ... was within district-court jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1345," and that abstention was inappropriate. 424 U.S. at 806. 
259. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, and 
Chief Justice Burger. 
260. The Colorado River Court divided the abstention cases into three general categories. 
424 U.S. at 814-17. See supra note 113 and accompanying text regarding the Court's inability to 
categorize the abstention doctrines in lasting, coherent fashion. 
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principles of sound judicial administration warranted the federal court 
staying its hand to avoid duplicating the effort of the state court. 
According to the Colorado River Court, the "exceptional circum-
stances" justifying abstention included (1) uncertainty as to whether 
the court had jurisdiction over the property at issue, (2) uncertainty as 
to which court took jurisdiction first, and (3) the fact that the federal 
court was distant from the controversy.261 The Court believed that 
each of these factors warranted abstention, but a fourth factor in par-
ticular was dispositive: Congress, in enacting the McCarran Amend-
ment,262 which permitted water-rights suits against the United States 
in state court, indicated a clear intent to have the state proceeding take 
precedence.263 ' 
As indicated by the dissenting opinions, there was good reason to 
question the Colorado River holding.264 First, most of the factors re-
lied upon by the Court, other than the congressional-intent rationale, 
did not seem necessarily to favor state jurisdiction. 265 Second, it was 
less than clear that the McCarran Amendment was intended to re-
quire abstention.266 But foremost, it seemed peculiar to deny the 
261. The Court explained: 
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of an exercise of concurrent juris-
diction, a federal court may also consider such factors as the inconvenience of the federal 
forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction 
was obtained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determinative; a care-
fully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction 
and the combination of factors counselling against that exercise is required. Only the clear-
est of justifications will warrant dismissal. 
424 U.S. at 818-19 (citations omitted). The Court also noted other factors which tended to 
support dismissal: the absence of any substantial progress in the federal court litigation, the 
presence of extensive rights governed by state law, and the government's willingness in similar 
suits to litigate in state court. 424 U.S. at 820. 
262. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), provides that "consent is given to 
join the United States as a defendant in any suit ... for the adjudication of rights to the use of 
water of a river system or other source •... " See 424 U.S. at 803. 
263. The Court stated: 
The clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran Amendment] is the avoidance of piece-
meal adjudication of water rights in a river system . . . . Indeed, we have recognized that 
actions seeking the allocation of water essentially involve the disposition of property and are 
best conducted in unified proceedings. The consent to jurisdiction given by the McCarran 
Amendment bespeaks a policy that recognized the availability of comprehensive state sys-
tems for adjudication of water rights as the means for achieving these goals. 
424 U.S. at 819 (citation omitted). 
264. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens con-
curred. Justice Stevens also dissented in a separate opinion. 
265. Justice Stewart maintained in dissent that the rule regarding in rem proceedings relied 
upon by the Court did not require exclusive possession of the property. 424 U.S. at 822-23 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, given the nature of the water-rights proceedings, the United 
States' suit in federal court would not lead to piecemeal litigation; rather, the determination of 
water rights (i.e., the priority of one's water claim) always occurs in one suit, with the actual 
allocation among parties with different water rights priorities occurring in another. 424 U.S. at 
823-24 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
266. 424 U.S. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("there is no basis for concluding that Congress 
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United States access to its own courts, particularly in Indian matters, 
where state court proceedings generally are disfavored.267 
Colorado River becomes even more perplexing when contrasted 
with the next major case to face the Court in this area, Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 268 In Moses Cone, a 
hospital and a contractor became entangled in a dispute over a con-
struction contract; by the terms of the contract, the matter was to be 
resolved by arbitration.269 After negotiations broke down, the hospital 
raced into state court and obtained a temporary order enjoining arbi-
tration. 270 The contractor then filed its own action in federal district 
court, but the federal court stayed the action pending resolution of the 
state court suit. 271 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Colorado River absten-
tion was inappropriate in Moses Cone, dismissing out of hand two fac-
tors that, given its holding in Colorado River, seemed to argue in favor 
of abstention: the state court proceedings were first in time, and there 
was some danger of piecemeal litigation.272 Instead, employing rea-
soning similar to that in Colorado River regarding Congress' intent in 
enacting the McCarran Amendment, the Moses Cone Court focused 
primarily on the congressional intent underlying the Arbitration Act. 
First, Congress sought "to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute 
out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. "273 
Moreover, in. enacting the Arbitration Act, Congress explicitly re-
quired that federal law would provide the rule of decision on the mer-
its of the dispute's arbitrability.274 
The difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that Congress' clear 
intent in enacting the Arbitration Act was that state courts were to 
apply that federal law.275 Colorado River indicated that the primary 
intended that Amendment to impair the private citizen's right to assert a federal claim in a 
federal court"). 
267. 424 U.S. at 826 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 424 U.S. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
268. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
269. 460 U.S. at 4-6. 
270. 460 U.S. at 7. 
271. 460 U.S. at 7. The district court justified its decision on the grounds that the two suits 
involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the contractor's claims. 460 U.S. at 7. 
272. The Court acknowledged that the state court proceedings were first in time, but pointed 
out that, just as in Colorado River, no significant progress had yet been made in these proceed· 
ings. 460 U.S. at 19-20. Moreover, any piecemeal litigation resulted from the nature of the 
dispute between the parties and from the fact that Congress intended arbitration to occur in only 
a portion of that dispute - the portion over which the parties had agreed to arbitrate. 460 U.S. 
at 21-22. 
273. 460 U.S. at 22. 
274. 460 U.S. at 23-24. 
275. Although the Arbitration Act "creates a body of federal substantive law •.• regulating 
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"exceptional circumstance" favoring abstention was Congress' intent 
that the suit proceed in state court.276 Yet Congress' intent in enact-
ing the Arbitration Act was far clearer than its intent in enacting the 
McCarran Amendment. Under the Arbitration Act, state courts were 
to resolve the claim by applying the federal arbitration law. Yet the 
Court approved state court proceedings in Colorado River but not in 
Moses Cone. 
Although the Court's reliance on congressional intent under its 
traditional approach is unsatisfying, the revisionist theory provides a 
basis for explaining these cases. This is seen when the Colorado River 
cases are contrasted with all other square-four cases. In all other 
square-four cases Younger is inapplicable because there is no pending 
state court proceeding to which the federal court might defer. This is 
either because the federal action is anticipatory or because any state 
case is itself removable to federal court. In the Colorado River cases, 
however, there is a pending state proceeding, and the question is 
whether the federal court ought to defer to that proceeding.277 
The answer lies in the fact thatjust as Colorado River cases are not 
quite typical square-four cases, neither are they mill-run Younger 
cases. What distinguishes the Colorado River cases from other 
Younger cases is the existence of simultaneous pending state and fed-
eral actions produced by some "special circumstances." But for the 
"special circumstances" in each of these cases, there would not be pro-
ceedings pending in both state and federal court, and Younger would 
be inapplicable. 
[arbitration agreements] ••• it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 .... " Thus "enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the state courts .... " 
460 U.S. at 25 n.32 (emphasis added). 
276. Congressional intent piayed a primary role in Colorado River and Moses Cone. See 
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820 ("the policy underlying the McCarran Amendment[] justif[ies] 
the District Court's dismissal in this particular case"); Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 22-23 (refusal of 
federal court to proceed was "plainly erroneous in view of Congress' clear intent" in enacting the 
federal Arbitration Act). In the most recent Colorado River case, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache 
Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), it became clear that, of all the "exceptional circumstances," congres-
sional intent is by far the most important: "Although giving lip service to the balancing of 
factors set forth in Colorado River, the Court essentially gives decisive weight to one factor: the 
policy of unified water rights adjudication purportedly embodied in the McCarran Amendment." 
463 U.S. at 575 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
277. Perhaps the real question ought to be why Colorado River cases are not square-three 
Younger cases. Why shouldn't the federal court in each case defer to the state court proceeding, 
at least insofar as Younger might dictate? It is not an entirely implausible explanation for these 
cases, therefore, that Colorado River was simply a last-ditch invention by those Justices opposed 
to broad application of Younger in civil cases. After all, Justice Brennan, the most vocal of the 
Younger critics, is the chief architect of Colorado River abstention. The other way to resolve 
these cases would be to apply Younger to all civil cases, whether or not the state had a convincing 
interest in the litigation sufficient to justify deference. Justice Brennan, however, would surely 
oppose this approach. 
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Moses Cone provides the clearest example. The contractor's fed-
eral suit was a diversity action.278 Absent diversity, Moses Cone would 
be a state court case. But why was the Moses Cone litigation in state 
court also? The contractor, subsequent to filing its federal action, re-
moved the state court action to federal court.279 Had this been the end 
of it, Moses Cone would have been a square-four case in which there 
was no pending state proceedings and in which, under the revisionist 
theory, federal resolution was perfectly appropriate, but a glitch arose. 
The federal court remanded the part of the state court action to state 
~ourt because there also was a nondiverse party present in state court 
- the architect - who was not present in the federal action.280 Ab-
sent this procedural quirk, Moses Cone either would have been a 
square-four diversity case in which abstention was inappropriate, or a 
state contract litigation raising no federal trial forum issue at all.28 1 
Because of the procedural quirk - the "special circumstance" -
Moses Cone was both. 
Colorado River is similarly anomalous. By all rights, Colorado 
River ought to be a Younger case. A federal action was filed, then a 
federal defendant sought to remove on the ground that the state issues 
could be better resolved in a pending state court action.282 Two fac-
tors, however, led to duplicate proceedings and a thorny question of 
which court should proceed. First, the Court construed the McCarran 
Amendment as dictating litigation of water-rights cases in state court 
to avoid duplicate litigation. Then, the Court held that the McCarran 
Amendment did not divest the federal court of jurisdiction over ac-
tions brought by the United States. Thus, there arose two actions and 
the need for a policy decision about whether both could proceed.283 
The Supreme Court has not, under the traditional approach, devel-
oped an adequate understanding of why Colorado River cases arise 
278. 460 U.S. at 1, 4. 
279. 460 U.S. at 7 n.4. 
280. 460 U.S. at 7 n.4. 
281. In fact, Moses Cone points to a bit of an anomaly posed by federal defenses arising in 
diversity cases. In a nondiversity case, federal defenses are litigated in state court. See supra 
notes 190-96 and accompanying text. The diverse state defendant, however, with the very same 
federal issues, can obtain federal review of those issues in federal court, not by virtue of federal 
question jurisdiction but because of diversity removal. 
282. 424 U.S. at 806. 
283. Another example of such quirky jurisdiction was presented in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. 
, Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). Will was a simple state insurance contract case. The defendant raised 
a federal defense based on the securities laws and filed a separate federal action raising those 
issues. 437 U.S. at 658. Thus, Will was a simple square-three case but for one problem: the key 
claim in federal court was one over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Reluc-
tant to dismiss that claim, which could not be adjudicated in state court, and equally reluctant to 
draw the entire litigation into federal court, the Court permitted both actions to proceed. 
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and how they should be treated. Under the revisionist theory, how-
ever, these anomalistic dual-proceedings cases can be resolved by ap-
plication of the revisionist theory's three forum decisions. This is seen 
by returning to the problem of the differing results in Moses Cone and 
Colorado River. Under the revisionist theory, those seemingly contra-
dictory results are explained easily. 
First there is the question of whether lower federal court resources 
are necessary in this kind of case. In Colorado River, not only was the 
Court skeptical about the need for an initial federal forum, it was also 
worried that to afford a federal forum would bring a tremendous 
amount of state law water-rights litigation into the federal courts.284 
Second, the revisionist theory looks to the adequacy of the state forum 
for raising any federal claim. In Colorado River, and in the Court's 
subsequent Indian water-rights decision, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache 
Tribe, 285 the Court went to lengths to ensure that any federal issue 
could be raised in state court, and to hold out the possibility of federal 
jurisdiction should the state courts fail to provide a forum for such 
claims.286 In Moses Cone, by contrast, the Court expressed doubt that 
the state court would give adequate attention to the federal claim 
raised there.287 In fact, despite Congress' intent that state courts exe-
cute federal arbitration policy, the Court plainly was skeptical about 
whether the state courts were up to the job,288 and so permitted the 
284. Colorado's purpose in enacting its Water Rights Determination and Administration Act 
was to provide state procedures for determining the increasing number of water claims. See 424 
U.S. at 804. 
285. 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
286. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820 ("We need not decide, for example, whether ... 
dismissal would be warranted ... if the state proceedings were in some respect inadequate to 
resolve the federal claims."); 424 U.S. at 812 ("[T]he Government's argument [against dismissal 
of the federal suit] rests on the incorrect assumption that consent to state jurisdiction for the 
purpose of determining water rights imperils those rights ... . ");San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 
U.S. at 559·60 ("[I]t is also clear ... that a dismissal or stay of the federal suits would have been 
improper if there was no jurisdiction in the concurrent state actions to adjudicate the claims at 
issue in the federal suits."). 
287. Although state courts are required as much as federal courts to grant stays of litigation 
under § 3 of the Arbitration Act, it was less clear whether the same was true of an order to 
compel arbitration under§ 4 of the Act. The Court noted that in many cases, a stay under§ 3 is 
adequate to protect the right to arbitration, but in a case such as Moses Cone, where the party 
opposing arbitration is the one from whom the payment is sought, a stay oflitigation alone is not 
enough. Thus, the state court proceeding might not provide adequate protection for the federal 
right. As the Court noted in Moses Cone: 
If the state court stayed litigation pending arbitration but declined to compel the hospital to 
arbitrate, [the contractor] would have no sure way to proceed with its claims except to 
return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order - a pointless and wasteful burden on the 
supposedly summary and speedy procedures proscribed by the Arbitration Act. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 27 (1983). 
288. See, to this effect, the Court's discussion in Moses Cone of North Carolina's historical 
hostility to arbitration. Although mouthing platitudes about the adequacy of state court adjudi-
cation - e.g., "[w]e are not to be understood to impeach the competence or procedures of the 
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cases to proceed in the lower federal courts. 
Finally, the Court must address the adequacy of its own review. In 
Colorado River and San Carlos Apache Tribe, the Court explicitly 
reassured all parties that direct review would be adequate.289 This 
surely is correct. If federal rights were inadequately respected, the pe-
titioner would be the United States, or at least the Indian tribes, both 
of which traditionally have been quite successful in obtaining Supreme 
Court review.29° Again, Moses Cone stands in sharp contrast: if the 
state court refused to order arbitration, that issue might not be appeal-
able in state court, and thus direct review would be unavailable. 
The Colorado River cases thus are anomalistic abstention cases. 
Application of the revisionist theory's analysis, however, consistently 
yields the correct result. 
5. Recapping Square Four: What's Left? 
Initially, square four seemed too broad to comport with the revi-
sionist theory: permitting any suit initiated by a federal plaintiff to 
proceed in federal court in the absence of a state proceeding that com-
pelled abstention under Younger would place cases in federal court 
that, for the reasons described at the outset of this section, would not 
be a wise use of lower federal court resources. As the foregoing dis-
cussion indicates, however, the non-Younger abstention doctrines 
serve to limit the scope of this right to a federal forum. 
These additional abstention doctrines pull a large number of cases 
out of federal court. Pullman removes cases where Ashwander dictates 
that the federal court should avoid premature decision of the federal 
question. Colorado River seeks to avoid duplicative litigation. Pull-
man, Burford, and Thibodaux all seek to avoid "needless friction" 
with state courts on purely state law questions where state court bias is 
not a problem. 
In all these cases, state review exists to protect state interests. Fed-
North Carolina courts," 460 U.S. at 26 - the Court plainly had grounds to suspect that the 
North Carolina courts would not eagerly enforce federal arbitration policy. The Court itself 
acknowledged that, "[a]s a historical matter, there was considerable doubt at the time of the 
District Court's stay that the North Carolina court would have granted even a § 3 stay of litiga-
tion." 460 U.S. at 27 n.36. 
289. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571 ("(A]ny state court decision alleged to 
abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought for review 
before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal 
interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment."); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 
(the Supreme Court may review questions raised in state court after final judgment by that court 
if such questions have been preserved) (quoting United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520, 
526 (1971)). 
290. See 424 U.S. at 812-13. Moreover, not even the dissenters argued that the state courts 
could not be trusted with fact-finding in these cases. 
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eral review is retained where necessary to protect federal interests. 
Remaining in federal court from square four are all those cases -
such as classic Monroe v. Pape-type actions challenging violations of 
federal rights by state officials - in which a federal trial forum is nec-
essary to protect federal interests, or in which no state interests are 
implicated.29 1 
E. Summing Up 
The matrix represented in Figure 3 below permits a comparison of 
the results which obtain under the revisionist theory with the results in 
individual cases under the traditional approach. As this Part has 
demonstrated, the results under both theories are largely the same, but 
the revisionist theory provides a more satisfying rationale for-these 
decisions. 
criminal: 
civil: 
FIGURE 3 
Younger abstention 
appropriate 
(state proceeding) 
Younger abstention; review 
by federal habeas court . 
Younger abstention -
procedural challenge: 
direct review adequate; 
possibility of federal trial 
forum if direct review 
unavailable 
substantive challenge: 
removal rules culprit; 
avoid removal rules with 
anticipatory action; 
otherwise, same 
safeguards as with 
procedural challenges 
Younger abstention 
inappropriate 
(no state proceeding) 
no Younger abstention; 
lower federal court review 
in anticipatory action 
no Younger abstention; 
federal jurisdiction limited 
by Pullman, Thibodaux. 
Bwford, Colorado River. 
291. Currie, supra note 2, at 328-29 ("[M]istrust of state courts is at its height when, as in 
Section 1983 cases, a state officer is charged with denying the asserted federal right."). 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: ON THE MERITS OF THE REVISIONIST 
THEORY 
Emerging from the shadow cast by the conflicting premises of the 
traditional approach, the revisionist theory provides a plausible expla-
nation for the abstention doctrines. Rather than viewing abstention 
decisions as running against the current of federal jurisdiction, the re-
visionist theory suggests that abstention is a consistent part of the 
overall scheme of federal jurisdiction. This section attempts to antici-
pate, and address, some of the potential objections to the revisionist 
theory. 
The first objection might be that the revisionist model requires too 
much ad hoc decisionmaking in order to determine whether to abstain 
in a given case, and thus fails in its promise to provide clear guidance 
to lower courts and litigants. This calls to mind a similarly posited 
objection raised by Professor Cohen to the thesis he advanced in his 
well-known article on federal question jurisdiction: "The short answer 
may be that the maze of analytical standards used by the courts [cur-
rently] has not, as has been shown, produced consistent and predict-
able results in hard cases. "292 It also calls to mind an obvious 
response: whatever its shortcomings, the revisionist model is, at mini-
mum, a substantial improvement over the current state of affairs. 
Although on its face the traditional approach may seem easy to 
apply, in reality this is not the case. The traditional approach presents 
the impression that one need only figure out which established cate-
gory a given case falls within - Younger, Pullman, or what have you 
- and the abstention result is clear. The rub comes in understanding, 
as the Court recently conceded, that the established doctrines them-
selves are anything but clear.293 Instead, there is interminable litiga-
tion not only about whether a case ought to be within a given doctrine, 
but also about what defines the doctrine itself. The confusion over the 
Colorado River doctrine or the long process of defining Younger ab-
stention are but two examples that come readily to mind.294 
292. Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise ''Directly" Under 
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 891, 908 (1967). 
293. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
294. Although both doctrines seem to have been clearly set forth in the initial cases, subse· 
quent cases indicate that both doctrines have undergone s'ubstantial change. Thus, the Younger 
doctrine relied upon to decide Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. bears almost no relation in rule or 
rationale to Younger itself. Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (relying primarily on 
principles of equity jurisdiction, as well as federalism concerns, to hold that federal court may 
not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding) with Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 
(1987) (relying solely on principles of federalism to hold that federal court may not entertain a 
challenge to fairness of state court civil proceedings when such proceedings are ongoing); see also 
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 104 (absence of clear Supreme Court guidance as to application of 
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The revisionist model stands in sharp contrast, for although its ap-
plication requires a number of multi-factored forum decisions, the the-
ory provides a bright-line standard for the majority of cases. Once a 
case falls within square one or square two, the abstention result is 
clear.295 The same generally is true for square-three cases, with the 
only inquiry going to the availability of a state forum in which to raise 
the constitutional issue.296 
The only square requiring case-by-case analysis is square four. 
However, it is with square-four cases, ironically, that the revisionist 
model offers its greatest advantage over the traditional approach. In 
any doctrinal area there will be difficult cases. The advantage of the 
revisionist theory is that it explains why the difficult cases fall into 
square four, and, within that square, defines and offers a concrete set 
of considerations to resolve them. 297 Moreover, as the standards of 
the revisionist theory are applied to square-four cases over time, guide-
posts for future decision likely will evolve.298 Rather than providing 
such guidance, the pigeonholing doctrines of the traditional approach 
obscure difficult decisions, stunting subsequent doctrinal coherence.299 
Substantive objections to the revisionist theory probably will be 
more vigorous. Some might argue that although the revisionist theory 
explains abstention and offers guidance for future cases, it does not go 
so far as to answer fundamental objections to the application of any 
abstention doctrine. But that is not the case. 
Although the objections to abstention are varied, the root concern 
is the same: removing a case from federal court denies the plaintiff a 
forum that Congress chose to make available precisely because such a 
Colorado River abstention criticized as "conclusory decisionmaking" and a "proliferation oflegal 
gibberish"). 
295. Abstention is appropriate in square-one cases. See supra notes 146-48 and accompany-
ing text. Abstention is inappropriate in square-two cases. See supra notes 157-59 and accompa-
nying text. 
296. So long as there is an adequate state forum in which to raise the federal issues, absten-
tion is appropriate in square-three cases. See supra notes 166-96 and accompanying text. 
297. Square four encompasses all those cases in which a federal defendant cannot initiate a 
state proceeding to displace the federal action under Younger, but where under the relevant 
considerations of the revisionist theory, abstention might be appropriate nonetheless. Applica-
tion of the relevant factors to square-four cases offers clear guidance as to whether abstention is 
appropriate even though Younger would not mandate it. 
298. To an extent, this has already occurred. Certain of the traditional approach's doctrines, 
such as Pullman and Thibodaux, had never been explained clearly by the Court. But Pullman 
and Thibodaux cases can now be resolved relatively mechanically by applying the revisionist 
theory's factors. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text for discussion of Pullman ab-
stention, and supra notes 215-34 and accompanying text for discussion of Thibodaux abstention. 
299. Thus, for example, Frank Mashuda, Thibodaux, and Winter Haven are, within the con-
text of the traditional approach, almost impossible to reconcile, making it difficult to decide how 
to resolve the next "Thibodaux" case. Yet, such difficulty evaporates once these cases are seen 
within the context of the revisionist theory. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text. 
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forum was necessary for the vindication of federal rights; conse-
quently, the plaintiff is forced into state court to the peril of federal 
interests. 3oo 
The entire basis of the revisionist theory, however, is that a federal 
trial forum should be, and is, available whenever necessary to vindi-
cate federal interests. 301 Wherever a federal trial forum is not neces-
sary, the theory trusts the mechanism of review by the Supreme Court 
to see to it that federal rights are not slighted by the states. 
If federal review is adequate to protect federal interests, the con-
cerns raised by abstention's critics should be resolved. Some critics, 
for example, decry the denial of a plaintiff's choice of forum, or the 
failure of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction despite their "unflag-
ging obligation" to do so. But these principles are meaningless in the 
abstract. The question is why the choice of forum should matter. 
Plaintiffs presumably choose federal fora, and federal fora have an ob-
ligation to proceed, when a federal forum is necessary to protect fed-
eral interests. If such a forum is unnecessary, because federal rights 
are adequately protected, these objections to abstention must, at least, 
be minimized. 302 
For the same reason, the revisionist theory ought to satisfy Profes-
sor Redish's separation-of-powers concerns. He argues that Congress 
has made the decision regarding those cases in which federal jurisdic-
tion is necessary, and that courts violate the constitutional framework 
of separation-of-powers by declining j1:1risdiction once granted.303 But 
Congress presumably grants and withdraws federal jurisdiction by an-
alyzing the same competing interests that are relevant under the revi-
sionist theory. It is fair to assume that Congress has no capricious 
interest in awarding jurisdiction in a topsy-turvy fashion, but makes 
the federal trial courts available when there is a danger of state bias or 
a concern that federal courts are necessary to protect federal rights.304 
By the same token, Congress has shown a concomitant concern for 
300. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
302. If there is no practical difference between proceeding in state or federal court with re-
gard to protection of federal rights, the only legitimate remaining concern would be symbolic. 
To the extent a symbolic concern sensibly exists in the absence of real concern as to results, 
however, the concern would hardly outweigh the legitimate grounds for abstaining. But see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 300-10 (arguing that plaintiff should have a choice of forum, thus 
allowing the "market" to determine whether parity exists between state and federal courts). 
303. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. See generally Redish, Separation of Pow-
ers, supra note 1. 
304. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-17 (1963) (habeas remedy extended to state 
prisoners by Act of 1867 to address state hostility to federal rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 173-80 (1961) (civil rights actions enacted to provide adequate federal remedy because states 
failed to protect federal rights). 
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state adjudicatory interests, and has enacted specific legislation prohib-
iting the federal courts from proceeding when significant state interests 
are at stake. 305 
The revisionist theory permits courts to fulfill the interest of Con-
gress in enacting jurisdictional statutes. The difficulty with congres-
sionally granted jurisdiction is that, as with much legislation, those 
statutory allocations necessarily are somewhat imprecise. Given the 
nature of Congress' task, it is difficult for Congress to draft jurisdic-
tional statutes that do anything more than carve out rough contours as 
to when federal jurisdiction is necessary or inappropriate. Oftentimes, 
those grants are overbroad, and the Supreme Court has sought to 
make a more sensitive allocation.3°6 But just as often the Court has 
taken an underinclusive statute and broadened it to ensure the availa-
bility of federal jurisdiction when necessary, 307 or at least taken a stat-
ute narrowly construed since its passage and broadened it to the same 
end.308 In reality, there is no separation-of-powers problem because, 
as the revisionist theory makes clear, the abstention decisions comport 
with the intent of Congress by ensuring adequate federal review.309 
305. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (fax Injunction Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (Anti-
Injunction Act); see also Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note l, at 81; Shapiro, supra note 2, 
at 581-82. 
306. That is, of course, the interpretation of Younger v. Harris under the revisionist theory. 
Other examples of Supreme Court decisions narrowing congressional grants include Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (denying habeas relief to certain procedurally defaulted claims); 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (limiting federal question juris-
diction to cases where a federal question appears on face of plaintiff's complaint); Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (holding that Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
state court judgments extends only to federal questions); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction); 
Several points must be made about these limiting decisions. First, sometimes they merely 
limit the breadth of federal jurisdiction, although it is difficult to see any sensible allocation. For 
example, Strawbridge undeniably limits the full scope of federal jurisdiction, but it is unclear 
what factor beyond the caseload of courts justifies the line drawn in that case. Second, even an 
attempt to draw a sensible line may or may not meet with success. For example, Mottley may 
have had the effect of withdrawing from federal jurisdiction cases that required a federal forum. 
See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text; Collins, supra note 102, at 766-77. Finally, it is 
arguable with regard to certain limiting decisions, such as Wainwright v. Sykes, whether the 
Court is furthering or frustrating the will of Congress. 
307. The most famous example may well be Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), in 
which the Court perverted legislative intent and strained any reasonable interpretation of the 
English language to hold that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar injunctions in civil rights 
actions. See Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. au. L. REv. 717, 733-39 
(1982); Currie, supra note 2, at 329 ("There was ·no excuse for the Mitchum decision."). 
308. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (broadening§ 1983's scope 90 years after its 
passage); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (broadening habeas statute 80 years after its 
enactment). 
309. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 574 (jurisdiction questions difficult to answer "in gross"; 
"measured authority to decline jurisdiction ... protects ... the principle of separation of pow-
ers"). Despite the logic of this position, Professor Redish nonetheless demurs. He argues that 
there is no evidence that Congress intended to delegate authority to the Supreme Court to nar-
row jurisdictional grants, or that Congress has acquiesced in judicial decisions that do so. See 
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Of course, this entire argument rests upon the notion that the ab-
stention cases as applied do afford a federal forum when necessary to 
protect federal rights. To the extent the forum provided is a federal 
district court, no one is likely to dispute the claim of adequacy. Disa-
greement likely will surface, however, with regard to the question of 
whether Supreme Court review really is adequate in those cases in 
which the revisionist theory depends solely upon the Court to provide 
a federal forum. If the critics are right that such review is not ade-
quate, the revisionist theory is in some difficulty. 
Frankly, there is no perfectly satisfactory answer to this concern. 
It is no doubt correct that the Supreme Court's own docket is suffi-
ciently heavy that many cases do not receive the attention they deserve 
from the Court.310 It also is probably true that every party with a 
federal claim would at least prefer to have the choice of going into a 
federal trial forum, rather than depending upon the adequacy of subse-
quent review. 
At the same time, it is obvious that it is untenable to take the posi-
tion that Supreme Court review is wholly inadequate.311 Abstention 
represents but one instance in which parties with federal claims are 
denied a federal trial forum. The denial of a federal trial forum in 
abstention cases pales in comparison to the denial effected by the case 
law regarding what constitutes a federal question,312 what is proper 
diversity,313 and when removal of a case from the federal courts is 
permitted.314 Cases in which abstention is required do not, by com-
Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 80-84. I do not believe that the lack of evidence is 
absolute, or that, even if it were, it would compel Professor Redish's conclusion. I intend to take 
up this issue in a later essay. 
310. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that 
institutional constraints preclude adequate oversight by the Court of states' application of federal 
law). See generally Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsi-
bilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681 {1984) (discussing docket problems). Some 
commentators have called for an intermediate court of appeals to ease the Supreme Court's 
docket pressure. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 2, at 1022 n.137 (summarizing commentary on 
such proposals). See generally Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the 
Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Im-
prove the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A. J. 841 (1973). 
311. Even those commentators critical of abstention frequently rely on Supreme Court re-
view to serve as a safeguard in some cases. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 2, at 1048-49 (relying on 
the Supreme Court to review federal claims of litigants who voluntarily litigate in state court); 
Field, Pullman Abstention, supra, note 2, at 1085 ("Despite its limitations, the availability of 
Supreme Court review does afford some protection against error or bias when state courts decide 
federal issues.") (footnote omitted). 
312. See generally Cohen, supra note 292. 
313. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
314. See Collins, supra note 102, at 752 (removal decisions "exclude from federal trial court 
jurisdiction an entire class of claims based on federal right or privilege, or an interpretation of 
federal law"). 
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parison, present a particularly compelling argument for the necessity 
of a federal trial forum. Yet, the alternative to the premise of the revi-
sionist theory concerning the adequacy of direct review is to concede 
that direct review is inadequate to protect federal rights in all cases 
and to allocate all federal claims to an initial federal forum. 
Even if it were possible as a practical matter to make a federal trial 
forum available on such a widespread basis, it is fair to ask whether it 
would be a desirable option. In one sense it would be: if state courts 
are not as sensitive to federal claims of right, and if the' Supreme Court 
cannot do an adequate job on direct review, then every claiin would 
get a better hearing in a lower federal court. However, in an equally 
important sense this would not be desirable: widespread availa~ility of 
federal fora would trivialize federal jurisdiction, removing the force 
and impact of federal judgments.315 Federal judges, confronted with 
the volume of mill-run litigation now occurring in state courts, might 
lose their vantage point and become cynical about the extent or values 
of federal protections.316 And widespread federal jurisdiction would 
draw a significant volume of litigation from the state courts, diminish-
ing their utility and import.317 
No commentator I know of argues for such a dramatic revision in 
the allocation of cases between federal and state courts. Of course, in 
arguing in favor of federal jurisdiction on any specific question, it be-
comes easy to overlook the cumulative effect. But few commentators, 
if faced with this cumulative effect, would advise tearing down all the 
barriers and affording universal access to a federal trial forum for fed-
eral claims. 
The question that remains then is what constitutes a wise use of 
federal judicial resources.318 It is obvious that direct review has its 
shortcomings as a mechanism for protecting federal interests. But the 
revisionist theory relies on direct review only in those cases where 
such review is most likely to be meaningful, guaranteeing a federal 
315. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
316. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1125-26 (arguing that the federal bench's distance from 
the application of constitutional doctrine is conducive to vigorous enforcement of constitutional 
rights). 
317. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exer-
cise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953) ("In the scheme of the Constitution~ [state 
courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the 
ultimate ones."); Bator, supra note 2, at 621 (state courts necessarily play large role in protecting 
constitutional rights). 
318. See Wells, Disparity, supra note 1, at 302 ("Problems spawned by federal jurisdiction 
may be so great, and the correlative advantages of a restrictive rule so plain, that even staunch 
supporters of federal courts acknowledge the need for limits on access."); Neuborne, supra note 
2, at 1128-29 ("civil rights lawyers exacerbate an already difficult caseload burden in the federal 
courts"). 
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trial forum where Supreme Court review is feared inadequate. In a 
world in which line drawing is necessary to resolve competing inter-
ests, the revisionist theory does a good job of providing a federal fo-
rum to those most in need of federal review. 
